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Appellate Jurisdiction 
This is a direct appeal from a final district court judgment. This Court has 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). The Court retained 
jurisdiction by an order dated May 26, 2010. 
Issues on Appeal 
1. The lower court erred as a matter of law by construing historic conveyance 
instruments to transfer title in fee simple absolute, when the governing law and language 
limited the rights of the transferee to no more than a right-of-way easement. 
2. The lower court erred by concluding as a matter of 1 aw that the scope of 
conveyances to an agricultural irrigation company "for canal purposes only" allowed the 
land to be used for a public walking trail, storm drain, and the piping of drinking water. 
3. The lower court erred by entering judgment as a matter of law in favor of 
the municipal appellees when clear and convincing record evidence supported the private 
landowner appellants' claim of abandonment. 
Standard of Review 
Each of the decisions on review was rendered below on summary judgment. 
Summary judgment determinations are reviewed for correctness with no deference given 
to the lower court's decision. See, e.g.,Parduhn v. Bennett, 2002 UT 93, H 5, 61 P.3d 
982. The evidence and all reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party. See, e.g., Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, \ 16, 990 P.2d 933. 
Summary judgment is not properly granted if the evidence would allow a reasonable fact 
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finder to return a verdict for the non-movant. Sr* / / / r //, ,;/;/? Scrvs.. hn \ /(<\ l Wr^ n* . 
7* •« • ; . •„ n . JVO j'..<,ti :\s8. 
Preservation Below 
Each «»r*Vc* issues presented was raised and preserved ;:: rU d strict coin! I h1 I-
24h IH'M I O.V l-l> > 'X , I (' I l)J ! ^ l ^ IM> "- 13). 
Statement of the Case 
Nature I" ;«M.( <»nr\. «>• f ' n a i i d m p , and Disposition Below 
^hc municipal oekr^:.J1 : .ir: (-\-• «:: • ..: .-, , « : . - . ; , -. . - • 
h - U ' ' : . . • 1 U ' O J d h e i H l g i i U u l J C u l l - P ^ * ' - 'J h e 
appellants are pi i vate landowners. 
The landowners filed suit in 2005 to redrew).. \ , . t ; ,- .'.;,"*;«.- o ( :: , 
of a canal easerru
 ; " • ' •- • me Municipal 
Parties' use ol luc easement as it the) owned n n> ice simple, based ^n H-e \h.-i iv ; j \ ; 
Parties' exceeding the scope of the original grant of car.rd rights; and based on the 
Municipal Parties' abandonment of the canal casuiiun i m I U I nl .irul moduli IIM \ In 
canal easen lent, which diiici iiuiii u;e 
historical irrigation canal use, include piping culinary water t\0.^.-h necesMtaied OM 
construction of large concrete structures), running storm drainage, and building noiManal 
surface uses such as a walking ise y,\\n\ in 
Ifn vesting documents; of MM4 and 1915. The district court was called upon to construe 
the terms of the vesting documents and the subsequent acts of the parties on this record, 
On summary judgment, the district court construed voluntary landowner transfer 
instruments and a judgment in condemnation to vest fee simple title. (R. 1 865-66). The 
court further held the modern uses of the irrigation canal easement did not exceed the 
scope of the right-of-way originally taken for canal purposes under a separate 
condemnation judgment entered on a jury verdict. (R.1866). The district court dismissed 
the appellants' claims based on scope and abandonment and entered summary judgment. 
(R.1867; R.1983). The district court entered final summary judgment in favor of 
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy (sometimes hereafter "Metro" or the 
"District"), Draper City, and Draper Irrigation Company ("Draper Irrigation") on March 
18,2010. (R.2442-48). This appeal followed. 
Statement of Facts 
The appellants are private property owners in Draper, Utah. Their land abuts real 
property that Utah Lake Irrigation Company ("Utah Lake Irrigation") acquired from the 
appellants' predecessors in the early 1900s for use as an irrigation canal. 
Historic Conveyances of Canal Rights to Utah Lake Irrigation 
In 1914 and 1915, Utah Lake Irrigation obtained necessary rights for four 
stretches, or "reaches," of the canal at issue in this case. Utah Lake Irrigation was a Utah 
corporation, incorporated for "the purpose of constructing, owning, maintaining and 
operating a pumping plant and canal system . . . and to carry on a general irrigation 
system for the sale and distribution of water to users along said line." (R.428-046, 
R. 1376-074). Around 1914, Utah Lake Irrigation was seeking the development of its 
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irrigation system to trans • > . . » , ' . - • , v 
southeast benches of the Salt Lake Valley. (R.l 123). 
The canaS rii;h^ were obtained in three different ways- CO cmii.ua o>. * .; , 
proceedings take?"» tc^-.^ivii;;;.; i ; -^- ;•.-..: x'crtlit 1 (," | ,i |ii< • • : ' ' ;- ; ' - n 
t ' f •' : . vujuniaiy transfers of land interests. 
(K. i 859(H),. ^ ; . , J : i i ; i , L:J i l , :Kv]; i^.iUun only had auib-rsi n- ^-juienv rer ;i light-
ed -A<I\ Set 2 Compiled 1 n\v<; of the Stnt? of ii<u^> •••.^ - •;- :
 ;
 !u ,;c..; . " : i ,e 
transfers h-> t ,u : . : 
Reach 16; In 1914, Utah Lake Irrigation obtained a warranty deed from Bayard 
4i!d \httiida C rr -gnue ('thv 'Tros^ru\e Gran' T"N (R 185°) The Crosgrove Grant 1 
conveyed ar.o A-^rrantet. . . . icpropei 
'•*i canai j ^ *nses onh " (RAMlSj. j nt 
Crosgrcne Grant i also specified (ha? i tah Lake Irrigation A a^  u- construct and maintain 
a v'i idgc and flumes for the use of the grantor,, and reserved I oi the grantors the i igl it to 
li'iiee auoss ilu i, iiii.il ,;il ilu limmdiii K"I ml iheir liiiii! 11*' I^Kji Aum M.mK Anthnnvj ,Hid 
De Vonna Costanza are the current owners of the property in Reach , c.
 vR.i 559). 
Reach 1" 'f *"* - T"ah I ake Ii rigation obtained a warranty deed from Baynard 
and MatiK'.-. -osgrove */., . osgrove Gi.ml ll,1" -tinI win n us* d (t^n/llit/i Willi lit, 
< msniovi (ii ill nil I till ,l( nisj'mM (iuiiit^'l (R.1859). The Crosgrove Grant II 
conveyed and warranted the Reach 17 property to Utah 1 ake Irrigation, then provided 
that "[s]aid strip r\.*u* [v ;,- tr hr used] for canal purposes only r > v.l85y). ^° 
Crosgrove *  * * i 
bridges and flumes for the use of the grantors. (R.958). Appellants Eric and Michaela 
Stem and Leland and Linda Richins are the current owners of the property in Reach 17. 
(R.1859). 
Reach 18: In 1914. Utah Lake Irrigation obtained a stipulated judgment in 
condemnation in the District Court of Salt Lake County against individuals within the 
Crane family (the "Crane Judgment'7). (R. 1859-60). The judgment condemned the 
property "for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a canal thereon," and decreed 
that Utah Lake Irrigation would "take and acquire and have for its use in fee" the Crane 
tract. (R.970, R.l 860). Appellant Loraine Berolatti is the current owner of the property 
in Reach 18. (R.1859). 
Reach 19: In 1915, Utah Lake Irrigation obtained a judgment in condemnation in 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, following a trial against Elida H. Smith (the 
"Smith Judgment"). (R.979, R.1860). The right awarded was an easement. (R.l862). 
The language of the easement provided that Utah Lake Irrigation would "take and acquire 
and have for its use for a right of way for its canal and for the construction, operation and 
perpetual maintenance of said canal and all matters pertaining there to for its successful 
operation into and over" the relevant tract of land. (R.979, R.1860). Appellants Lloyd 
and Lorraine Cummings own property on the western side of Reach 19. (R.1860). 
Draper Irrigation Co.'s Acquisition, Changes in Use, and Abandonment 
In 1921, Utah Lake Irrigation transferred its rights in the canal to Draper 
Irrigation. (R.902). Draper Irrigation was a Utah corporation, existing to serve its 
shareholders, and from 1921 forward, used the canal to deliver irrigation water. (R.2295-
430567V.3 5 
96). After the acquisition of Utah Lake Irrigation's rights in the canal. Draper Irrigation 
continued to use the canal for irrigation water, as the canal was dedicated to delivering 
irrigation water from the Jordan River to land in southeastern Salt Lake County. (R.339, 
R.428-046,R.1176). 
Draper Irrigation used the property for the sole purpose of conveying irrigation 
water to its shareholders, as stipulated in its 1975 Storm Drainage and Flood Control 
Agreement with Salt Lake County, wherein Draper Irrigation affirmed that it operated the 
canal property "for the purpose of conveying irrigation water to its shareholders, and for 
no other purpose." (R.346). Draper Irrigation further specified that its canals "were 
constructed and engineered to handle irrigation water in specified amounts but were not 
constructed or engineered to serve as flood control channels." (R.346). 
In 1983, Draper Irrigation recorded a document with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's office in which it purported to "correct" what it called "problems" with 
recorded descriptions of its property rights in the canal. (R.428-049). 
As early as 1993, and by 1995 at the latest, Draper Irrigation terminated its use of 
the canal. (R.903, R.l003, R.l 103, R.l216, R.l221). Draper Irrigation designed, 
developed, and constructed a new pressurized irrigation system utilizing most of the 
canal property, but not the property across Reaches 16 through 19, as that portion of the 
pipeline was constructed distant from the reaches. (R.903, R.l 104). 
In connection with that new irrigation system, in 1992 Draper Irrigation filed a 
document with the Utah State Engineer entitled "Application for Permanent Change of 
Water" (the "Permanent Change Application"). (R.l 158). In the Permanent Change 
Application, Draper Irrigation explained that it would use the same points of diversion 
and re-diversion for its new pipeline system, with "the exception of the Draper Irrigation-
Sandy Pumping Station on the East Jordan Canal, which [would be] abandoned," which 
was the structure necessary to deliver water into Reaches 16 through 19 of the canal. 
(R.l 106, R.l 161). Draper Irrigation changed the point of re-diversion from the East 
Jordan Canal, and promised that the old re-diversion, which pumped water into the open 
Draper canal would "be abandoned, and a new, second point of diversion [would] be 
established." (R.l 114, R.l 162, R.l 164). 
Beginning in 1993, Draper Irrigation stopped cleaning and maintaining the canal, 
even allowing an abandoned car to be left in the canal. (R. 1192, R. 1215, R. 1221, 
R.l 225). Instead, neighbors adjoining the canal cleaned garbage out of the canal to 
maintain it and keep it clean. (R. 1192, R. 1215-16, R. 1221, R. 1225). After 1993, only 
incidental storm waters were seen in the canal following heavy storms. (R.l004, R.l 105, 
R.l 192). Prior to 1993, Draper Irrigation had complained that storm runoff interfered 
with its ability to maintain and use the canal. (R.l 143). 
Draper City's Acquisition of the Canal Property for Other Uses 
In 1998, Draper City negotiated with Draper Irrigation to acquire the canal to turn 
it into a public trail. (R.83, R.93). That same year, Draper Irrigation recorded a Notice 
of Interest with the Salt Lake County Recorder's office, asserting general ownership 
rights in the canal property. (R.428-054 through -067). 
In 2001, Draper City entered into a contract with Draper Irrigation to acquire the 
canal. (R.383-86, R.904). Draper Irrigation then transferred its rights in the canal to 
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Draper City (R.383-86, R.904). The agreement provided that Draper City acquired the 
canal 4kfor use as a public trail and for storm drainage purposes." (R.383). The 
agreement stated further that Draper Irrigation reserved a 10-foot easement for 
construction and maintenance of culinary and secondary water lines and facilities. 
(R.383). In exchange, Draper City transferred 10 different acres of undeveloped land to 
Draper Irrigation. (R.383). 
That same year, Draper City commissioned a canal survey report known as the 
Gilson Report. (R.16, R.141). The Gilson Report concluded that the canal would be an 
"ideal" place for a trailway and utility location. (R.141). However, the Gilson Report 
noted: 'There may be legal challenges by property owners. As we have discussed in the 
past, the title issues along this corridor are not clearly defined. These title issues vary 
from fee title between private property owners and conflicts with the canal corridor." 
(R.142). 
Metro's Acquisition of the Canal Property for Non-Canal Uses 
In 2002, Metro applied to Draper City to build a water treatment plant and 
aqueduct system. (R.17, R.145). When Draper City denied the application, Metro filed 
suit. (R.17, R.145). In 2003, Draper City settled Metro's suit by a Stipulation and 
Settlement Agreement. (R. 144-52). 
This agreement provided that Draper City would convey an easement to Metro to 
construct and maintain a culinary water aqueduct known as the Point of the Mountain 
Aqueduct, to be placed in the Canal right-of-way. (R.149). In exchange, Metro was to 
pay Draper City $500,000 and acquire at its sole expense any additional necessary 
easements (R 148) The agreement provided that Draper City "makes no warranties as 
to its ownership of the Canal right-of-way " (R 149) The agreement further provided 
that Metro was required to spend up to SI 2 million for "grading, earthwork and hard 
surfacing for an eight foot wide public trail, and construction of a storm swale, low flow 
pipeline and other storm water improvements to be determined by the City."1 (R.148-
49). These provisions were later modified to change the storm swale to a storm drain. 
(R.19). 
Acting pursuant to this agreement, m August 2004, Draper City purported to 
convey to Metro an easement, with the caveat that the City "makes no warranty that it is 
lawfully [seized] of or has good title to the Easement Property, or any portion thereof." 
(R.428-075). In the conveyance documents, Draper City agreed not to "build, install, 
allow or otherwise place upon the Easement Property within fifteen feet of the centerline 
of the Pipeline (i) any permanent structure, including but not limited to building or 
masonry fences, or (ii) any structure which interferes with, or renders more difficult or 
expensive Grantee's use of the rights-of-way and easements granted under this 
Agreement." (R.482-076). 
In 2005, Metro staked its alleged forty-nine-and-a-half-foot easement across the 
Canal. (R.282). In June 2005, private property owners adjoining the Canal were given 
12 days to remove personal property and fixtures from Metro's so-called "work area." 
(R.282). The drinking water aqueduct was to be five feet in diameter, with an additional 
1
 A "swale" is "a low-lying or depressed and often wet stretch of land." Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Diet. 1189 (10th ed. 1999). 
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three-foot drainage pipe, both to be placed underground: and the public trail was built on 
top of them. (R.282, R.436-38). In connection with the aqueduct, Metro built large 
concrete blocks within Reaches 16 through 19, which function as air valve structures, and 
which rise eight feet above ground and are approximately nine feet by nine feet in 
dimension. (R.1099, R.l 196, R.1412). One of these blocks is directly in front of the 
Sterns' front door. (R.1099, R.l 196). Appellants submitted evidence that the land 
surrounding the aqueduct has not been restored to original grade or grade of similar 
substance as existed prior to the construction, and will not accommodate natural surface 
water drainage. (R. 1090, R. 1197, R. 1217). As of the time of this appeal, the 
improvements have been completed. (R.885, R.901). 
Summary of the Arguments 
This Court should reverse and remand for three principal reasons. 
First, the district court incorrectly concluded that the voluntary transfer 
instruments and the stipulated condemnation judgment granted rights in fee simple 
absolute on Reaches 16-18. The district court misconstrued the voluntary transfers to be 
fee simple conveyances based primarily on "conveys and warrants" language, but without 
properly considering subsequent language limiting the use to canal purposes only. There 
is no mention of fee title. Under this Court's established precedents, the subsequent 
limiting language controls, making the transfers easements, not fee-simple title transfers. 
Even if they were fee-simple transfers, moreover, the subsequent limiting language acts 
2
 Since the conclusion of the district court case, the former canal land now carries fiber 
optic transmission lines as well. 
as a restrictive covenant that runs with the land, dictating the same result as if these were 
easements. 
Furthermore, as a matter of law, Utah Lake Irrigation had no legal authority to 
condemn more than a right-of-way easement at the time of the judgment and so could not 
have obtained rights in fee simple through a judgment. Overlooking this governing legal 
limitation, the district court misconstrued the 1914 judgment as awarding rights in fee 
simple absolute. This Court should correct the district court's error. 
Second, the district court improperly construed the scope of easement language 
granting the use of land "for canal purposes only" by allowing, on summary judgment, 
such new and different uses as the piping of drinking water, storm drainage, and a public 
walking trail. As a matter of law, these uses are outside the scope of the original canal 
easements and can only be expanded in this way by purchasing or condemning rights 
held by the record title holders. 
Third, the district court improvidently granted summary judgment when the 
landowner appellants produced clear and convincing evidence supporting their 
abandonment claim. Record evidence shows with convincing clarity that Draper 
Irrigation Company ceased using the canal easement in the 1990s, intended to abandon its 
use, ceased maintenance and cleanup, diverted its irrigation water through another means 
of conveyance, diverged from the canal route at a point upstream and in a different 
direction, and announced its intentions to the world. On this record, it was reversible 
error for the district court to dismiss the landowners' abandonment claim on summary 
judgment. 
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For these reasons, the district court's judgment should be reversed. 
Argument 
1. The district court erred as a matter of law by construing the granting 
documents and decrees for Reaches 16-18 as conveyances in fee simple with 
personal covenants and not as transfers of easements or rights-of-way. 
On summary judgment, the district court indulged a presumption that title 
conveyed by the Reach 16-17 documents was fee simple absolute, then held that 
language stating the land was "to be used for canal purposes only" was insufficient to 
overcome that presumption. (R.1866). The district court further held that the Crane 
Judgment condemned Reach 18 in fee simple absolute. (R.1865). In so doing, the lower 
court failed to adhere to controlling Utah law on the construction and interpretation of 
deeds and Utah statutes governing eminent domain proceedings. 
First, the plain language of the Crosgrove Grants demonstrates that the parties 
intended to grant to Utah Lake Irrigation easements in Reaches 16 and 17, not title in fee 
simple. Furthermore, even if a fee simple title had been granted, the subsequent limiting 
language acts as a restrictive covenant on the land that does not entitle the Municipal 
Parties to use the land as if title were held in fee simple absolute. Second, the law of 
eminent domain in effect in 1914 only permitted courts condemning canal property to 
grant an easement, not title in fee simple. 
Consequently, as discussed in detail below, this Court should hold that Metro (as 
the successor-in-interest to Utah Lake Irrigation) currently holds the land in Reaches 16 
through 18 for canal purposes only. 
A. As a matter of Jaw, the Crosgrove Grants conveyed easements to 
Reaches 16 and 17 or otherwise restricted the successors-in-interest; 
they did not convey title in fee simple with personal covenants. 
The intent of the parlies controls the interpretation of a deed. JWN Corp. v. 
Veibell, 2004 UT 60, H 4] , 96 P-3d 935 (citing Park v. Wilkinson, 60 P. 945, 946 (Utah 
1900)). "[l]f the language within the four corners of the [deed] is unambiguous, the 
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, 
and the [deed] may be interpreted as a matter of law." WebBank v. American Gen, 
Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88 J )9,54P.3d 1139. 
Significantly, the parties' intent derives from "every part" of the deed, with 
"clauses subsequent to the granting clause . . . given effect so as to curtail, limit, or 
qualify the estate conveyed in the granting clause." Haynes v. Hunt, 85 P.2d 861, 863 
(Utah 1939) (emphasis added). "It is an elemental rule of construction that in construing 
[deeds] every word must be given effect if possible and reasonable, upon the theory that 
the grantor used no words except those necessary or convenient to express the intent of 
the parties." Id. at 864. 
1. This Court's precedents confirm that the Crosgrove Grants 
should be construed as easements. 
A fee simple title is generally presumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance of 
real estate. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-3. However, no such presumption is given if it 
appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate was intended. Id. The Crosgrove Grants 
do not purport to convey title in fee simple. (R.948, R.958). Although they are each 
entitled "Warranty Deed," the documents do not explicitly state the type of estate 
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transferred through the deed. Instead, the Crosgrove Grants provide that they convey and 
warrant certain property, and the property is to be used for a limited purpose. (R.948, 
R.958). 
This Court holds that a qualifying clause setting forth the intended use for the 
property subsequent to the phrase "conveys and warrants" is "such language as would 
naturally be used to qualify or limit the grant, to change it from a fee to an easement." 
Haynes, 85 P.2d at 864. This is true because a description of property for a grant of fee is 
complete without the clause describing the property's intended use; so "unless the clause 
is used to limit or qualify the grant it can serve no purpose whatsoever." ld.\ 
The authorities are in accord on this point. See, e.g., Brown v. Penn Cent. Corp., 
510 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Ind. 1987) (holding that a deed to a railroad company "for Depot 
and Rail Road purposes" conveyed only an easement); Harvest Queen Mill & Elevator 
Co. v. Sanders, 370 P.2d 419, 422-24 (Kan. 1962) (holding that a deed to a railroad 
company with language following the granting clause providing that it was "for the 
purpose" of constructing and maintaining a railroad conveyed only an easement); 
Sanborn v. Minneapolis, 29N.W. 126, 126-27 (Minn. 1886), overruled on other grounds, 
Nieting v. Blondell, 235 N.W.2d 597 (Minn. 1975) (concluding that where some parts of 
a deed indicate conveyance in fee, language in the deed limiting use indicated that the 
parties intended to convey only an easement); Gold Mt. Dev., L.L.C. v. Missouri Flat, 
Ltd., 2005 UT App 276, *4 (unpublished) (holding that the language "for grazing and 
agricultural purposes" is inconsistent with a full grant of rights). Furthermore, courts 
have construed documents purporting to convey property in fee simple as easements in 
accordance with the circumstances under which the easement was given. See Preseault 
v. United States, 100F.3d 1525, 1535-36 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that although a deed 
purported to grant fee simple, the deed was given following survey and location of nght-
of-way, and should therefore be construed as conveying only an easement in accordance 
with law which provided that only rights-of-way could be conveyed for railroad 
purposes). 
In this Court's important Haynes decision, the plaintiff sued to quiet title when the 
defendant claimed an interest in plaintiffs land to select sites for fishing and camping 
under a deed that "convey[ed] and warranted]" the land to defendant "for the 
propagation offish and the removal of the same." 85 P.2d at 864. This Court held that, 
although the language '"hereby convey and warrant' normally implies a grant of the fee 
. . the qualifying clause, 'to be used for the propagation offish and the removal of the 
same'" signified the deed conveyed an easement, not a grant in fee simple. Id. An 
easement, the court concluded, was "the most" the defendant could claim. Id. at 866. 
Like the deed in Haynes, both of the Crosgrove Grants "convey[ed] and 
warranted]" Reaches 16 and 17 to Utah Lake Irrigation. See id. at 862. But also like the 
deed in Haynes, the Crosgrove Grants contained limiting language subsequent to the 
property description that explicitly circumscribed the purpose for the land conveyed. See 
id. Indeed, the Crosgrove Grants went even further than the deed in Haynes, expressly 
providing that the land here was to be used "for canal purposes only." The deed in 
Haynes did not include the word "only" - further strengthening the conclusion here that 
the limiting clause in the Crosgrove Grants acted to convey an easement with a limited 
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scope, not an estate in fee simple. This limiting language may not be deemed superfluous 
- it is language that is necessarily included "to qualify or limit the grant, to change it 
from a fee to an easement." See id. at 864. 
The district court disregarded the legal effect of this limiting language, holding 
instead that the Crosgrove Grants "were standard warranty deeds that 'conveyed and 
warranted' the properties to [Utah Lake Irrigation]." (R.l 865). The lower court did 
recognize the principle of limiting language, ruling that "convey and warrant" language 
"has been held at common law to imply the granting of a fee, unless there is a qualifying 
clause in the granting language." (R.l 865-66). But the district court then failed to give 
effect to the very limiting language called out in the Crosgrove Grants. Haynes dictates 
precisely the opposite result. 
The district court relied on Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976), 
for the proposition that a party who attacks a deed has the burden of proving that it is not 
a deed in fee simple by clear and convincing evidence. (R.l 866). Jacobson is not 
applicable to this case, and the stated proposition is insupportable in this context. 
In Jacobson, the plaintiffs signed and delivered a warranty deed with the names of 
the grantors and grantees left blank. 557 P.2d at 157. After defendants fully paid money 
owed on property, they filled in their names as the grantees on the deed. Id. Plaintiffs 
filed suit, arguing that, despite the plain language of the deed, the deed was intended as a 
"mortgage," and the court should therefore reform the deed in equity. Id. This Court 
disagreed, holding that the plain language of the conveyance instrument - which did not 
contain limiting language like that at issue here - was a deed that conveyed title in fee 
simple. Id. at 158. 
In the instant case, the landowners did not "attack the deed," nor did they ask the 
trial court to equitably reform the Crosgrove Grants, but rather sought construction of the 
conveyances based on their plain language. Haynes, not Jacobson, applies and controls. 
Haynes does not call for application of a "clear and convincing" standard to overcome 
any presumption. Instead, Haynes calls for the Court to read and give effect to the plain 
language of the conveyances themselves - all the language, including the subsequent 
limiting language. No presumption of fee simple title applies when language on the face 
of the deed limits the estate conveyed. Moreover, even if a presumption applied, and 
even if a clear and convincing standard were required to overcome it, the subsequent 
limiting language in the deed itself clearly and convincingly meets the burden of 
overcoming any presumption that a fee simple title was intended to be conveyed. The 
plain language controls and mandates this result. 
2. Even if the Crosgrove Grants are construed as conveying fee 
simple title, they contain restrictive covenants applicable to the 
Municipal Parties. 
After concluding that the Crosgrove Grants conveyed fee simple title, the trial 
court explained the language "for canal purposes only5' as a personal "covenant" between 
the grantor and grantee that would not affect title or bind successive owners. (R.l 866). 
This Court should reverse. The Crosgrove Grants conveyed easements, not fee simple 
title, making the district court's conclusion a legal nullity. See Nyman v. Anchor Dev.t 
L.L.C., 2003 UT 27, H 18, 73 P.3d 357 (recognizing that an easement for a particular use 
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allows only use of property belonging to another for that limited purpose). The granting 
language is that of limitation, not covenant. However, even if it were a covenant, it 
should be construed as a restrictive covenant that runs with the land and binds successors. 
not merely a personal covenant between discrete landowners as the district court 
suggested. (R.1866). 
A covenant is deemed to run with the land, and therefore is binding on successor 
owners, if three characteristics are met: (1) the covenant must touch and concern the land; 
(2) the covenanting parties must intend the covenant to run with the land; and (3) there 
must be privity of estate. See Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 
618, 623 (Utah 1989). 
There is no doubt that the covenant to use the relevant land "for canal purposes 
only" is a covenant that touches and concerns the land. A covenant touches and concerns 
the land when burdens and benefits created relate to the land. Id. Here, the covenant 
involves the use of the land. Further, there is no doubt that there is privity of estate 
between both appellants and their successors-in-interest, who claim the benefits of the 
restrictive covenant, and Utah Lake Irrigation and its successors-in-interest, who suffer 
the burden of the restrictive covenant. See id. at 628 n.12. 
The intent of the covenanting parties that the "for canal purposes only" restriction 
run with the land is readily apparent from the nature of the covenant and the placement of 
the relevant language within the Crosgrove Grants. See id. at 627 (noting that, in addition 
to express statements in the doctrine that the parties intend to create a covenant running 
with the land, "[t]he parties' intent may also be implied by the nature of the covenant 
itself). li[T]he language of [the parties'] transaction, read in light of the circumstances 
of its formulation" indicates the parties' intent. Canyon Meadows Home Owners Ass 'n v. 
Wasatch County, 2001 UT App 414, ^ 16, 40 P.3d 1148 (citing 9 RJCHARD R. POWELL, 
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.04[3][b] (Michael Allan Wolfed., 2001)). 
Furthermore, one factor that strongly favors a construction that a covenant was intended 
to run with the land includes the retention and beneficial use of adjacent land by the 
grantor. ld.^ 19. 
The restrictive covenant that "land is to be used for canal purposes only," with no 
other qualifiers or modifiers, is the type of covenant that by its very nature would run 
with the land. It is not the type of covenant that is personal in nature, such as a covenant 
requiring that a party pay attorneys fees arising from enforcing the covenants of a lease, 
see Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 104 P.2d 619, 624 (Utah 1940), or a covenant of warranty, 
see H.T.&C Co. v. Whitehouse, 154 P. 950 (Utah 1916). Whether the property was used 
for canal purposes or for any purpose whatsoever would have a permanent effect of a 
physical nature upon the land itself affecting its usefulness and value. See First W. 
Fidelity v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 492 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah 1971). 
The Crosgrove Grants were given to Utah Lake Irrigation at the time that 
properties all around Reaches 16 and 17 were being condemned solely for the purpose of 
the easement, so the circumstances of the transfer clearly indicate that the canal was 
intended to be used for canal purposes only. The predecessors-in-interest to the current 
owners of Reaches 16 and 17 retained land adjacent to the conveyed property. Each of 
these factors concerning the type of grant and the circumstances surrounding the grant 
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weighs in favor of a determination that these reaches were conveyed with restrictions that 
were intended to run with the land. 
Finally, the language of the conveyance itself urges the conclusion that the 
restrictive covenant was intended to run with the land. In Crosgrove Grant I, there are 
three restrictions. The second restriction is the one at issue in this case, that "[s]aid strip 
of land [is to be] used for canal purposes only." (R.948). The first restriction was that 
Utah Lake Irrigation agreed to construct and maintain a bridge and flumes for the use of 
the grantor. (R.948). The third restriction reserved the right for the grantors to fence 
across the canal at the boundaries of the grantors' land. (R.948). These restrictions all 
indicate that there would be restrictions to benefit the owners of the land, and burden the 
irrigation company, with no indication that Utah Lake Irrigation's covenants were 
personal between Utah Lake Irrigation and the Crosgroves. All three restrictions touch 
and concern the land, and would continue to benefit successor landowners by allowing 
the landowners the ability to cross the canal by bridge and to obtain water through the 
flumes. The "canal purposes only" language is even stronger - does not even reference 
the grantor - providing a blanket restriction on the use of the property. The language in 
Crosgrove Grant II contains similar restrictions to Crosgrove Grant I. (R.958). If "canal 
purposes only" is a covenant, it is a covenant that runs. 
If the Court construes the Crosgrove Grants as deeds in fee simple, the Court 
should hold that the lower court erred in ruling that the restrictions on the face of the 
Crosgrove Grants were personal covenants between the initial grantors and grantee only. 
Thus, regardless whether the Crosgrove Grants are construed as easements or as 
containing restrictive covenants, reversal is called for here. 
B. As a matter of law, the Crane Judgment granted an easement to Reach 
18, which is the only estate Utah Lake Irrigation could legally obtain 
through an eminent domain judgment in 1914. 
In 1914, as today, Utah statutory law prescribed the precise types of estates and 
rights in lands that could be taken in eminent domain for public use. See 2 Compiled 
Laws of the State of Utah, § 3589 (1907); Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-502 (2010). Only 
specified types of land could be taken in fee simple for public use: public buildings or 
grounds, permanent buildings, reservoirs and dams (and outlets for the flow therefrom), 
and a place for deposit of debris of a mine, mill, or smelter. 2 Compiled Laws of the 
State of Utah, § 3589(1) (1907). For any other public use, only an easement could be 
taken. Id. § 3589(2); see Wasatch Gas Co. v. Bouwhuis, 26 P.2d 548, 550-51 (Utah 
1933) (recognizing that certain types of land, such as land for a railroad or highway, 
could only be acquired by condemnation proceedings as an easement over land); see also 
Mason v. Utah, 656 P.2d 465 (Utah 1982) (citing the successor statute to section 3589 
and recognizing that the statute applied in the context of condemnation proceedings and 
eminent domain). 
Indeed, the statute authorizing the taking of land for a canal through eminent 
domain proceedings only allowed the taking of a right of way—not title in fee simple. 
See 2 Compiled Laws of the State of Utah, § 3466 (1907) (providing that an entity "shall 
have a right of way . . . for the construction, maintenance, repair and use of. . . canals" 
upon payment of just compensation, but that the right of way should not interfere with or 
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unnecessarily injure any public or private property) (emphasis added). A leading water 
treatise published at the time of the condemnations summarized that i4[w]here a strip of 
land has been condemned for a right of way for ditches and canals under the power of 
eminent domain, the party who has acquired the right acquires merely an easement, and 
not an absolute fee to the land." 2 CLESSON S. KJNNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS § 1098 (2d ed. 1912). 
In this case, the Crane Judgment on Reach 18 was obtained as a Judgment in 
Condemnation. The Crane Judgment entered a decree conveying land to Utah Lake 
Irrigation in an action relating to Reach 18 that was commenced "to condemn the 
property hereinafter described for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a canal 
thereon." (R.970). Land for a canal was not included on the statutory list enumerating 
property that could be taken in fee simple. See 2 Compiled Laws of the State of Utah, § 
3589 (1907). Instead, it fell into the category of "any other public use," for which only 
an easement could be taken. See 2 Compiled Laws of the State of Utah, § 3589(2) 
(1907). Consequently, the only estate that could legally be conveyed by the Crane 
Judgment was an easement. 
In reaching its decision below, the district court ignored this legal limitation on the 
type of estate that could be conveyed. The court focused rather on language in the 
condemnation judgment that said the land was taken "for use in fee." (R.970). The 
lower court ruled that because "the Crane Judgment specifically refers to [Reach 18] as 
being conveyed 'in fee,'" the land was conveyed in fee simple to Utah Lake Irrigation, 
not as an easement. (R.1865). This was legal error. "The courts hold that [the rule that 
an easement for a canal is the only conveyance permitted under eminent domain 
authority] is the correct rule, even where the statute in terms provide that the condemner 
4
 shall be seized in fee' of the land condemned, or language of similar purport." 2 
KINNEY, supra, § 1098. 
Furthermore, this Court has held, in a condemnation action initiated pursuant to a 
statute in which the condemning party could acquire no more than a right-of-way, that the 
court must construe the judgment in a matter that "brings the judgment into harmony with 
the facts and the law." Moon Lake Water Users Ass'n v. Hanson, 535 P.2d 1262, 1263-
64 (Utah 1975). In Moon Lake Water Users, this Court invoked that fundamental 
principle to hold that the land conveyed was a right-of-way, not title in fee simple 
absolute. See id. Similarly here, the estate conveyed was a right-of-way - the only type 
of estate that could be conveyed in eminent domain proceedings for canal property in 
1914. 
The law precludes the Crane Judgment from awarding any conveyance other than 
an easement or right of way, despite language stating that the property was condemned 
"for [Utah Lake Irrigation fs] use in fee." (R.970) (emphasis added). There is authority 
for the proposition that the phrase "in fee" can have a durational meaning in the context 
of the granting of an easement, though it is only a minority view. The phrase "in fee" can 
indicate that the easement is to be perpetual in duration when used for the stated purpose. 
See Double I Ltd. P'ship v. Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 588 A.2d 624, 629-30 (Conn. 1991); 
Johnson v. Ocean Shore R.R. Co., 94 Cal. Rptr. 68, 71 (Cal. App. 1971); Rosenblum v. 
Eisenhauer, 280 A.2d 537, 541 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1971) ("An easement may be a 
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freehold or a chattel interest according to its duration, and may be enjoyed in fee, and it 
may be a base, qualified, or determinable fee, or it may be less than a fee, or even for a 
term of years"). Even the plain language of the relevant document here provided for a 
use in fee. not that the condemnor would own the property in fee. The district court erred 
as a matter of law in this context by relying on such language to hold that the Crane 
Judgment conveyed Reach 18 in fee simple. 
In sum, the estate granted for each of Reaches 16 through 18 was an easement or 
right-of-way or a restriction that runs with the land. This Court should so hold as a 
matter of law, reversing the district court in the process. 
II. The district court erred as a matter of law in holding that the Municipal 
Parties' expansion of the use of the easements did not exceed the easements' 
scope. 
The Municipal Parties conceded below, and the lower court concluded in its 
decision, that the 1915 Smith Judgment took a right-of-way easement over Reach 19. 
(R.922, 1866). The judgment was obtained by Utah Lake Irrigation to "take and acquire 
and have for its use for a right of way for its canal and for the construction, operation and 
perpetual maintenance of said canal." (R.979). However, the district court ruled that 
Metro's current "use of Reach 19 does not exceed the scope of the easement 
contemplated." (R.l 866). Because of its prior ruling regarding Reaches 16-18, the 
district court did not apply its analysis to those reaches. 
This Court's next inquiry is thus whether Metro's use of the canal right-of-way 
exceeded the scope of the easement expressed in the relevant conveying document for 
Reach 19. This Court's analysis should apply to Metro's use of Reaches 16-18 as well, 
as the limiting language in the vesting documents for each reach indicates that the land 
was to be used "for canal purposes only'' and "for the purpose of constructing and 
maintaining a canal." (R.948, R.958, R.970, R.975). Consequently, this section of the 
brief will analyze each of the reaches. In each case, the Municipal Parties' use of the 
land exceeds the scope of the easement. 
A. The district court disregarded the express granting language of the 
easements, which allows only the construction and maintenance of a 
canal—not drinking water pipes, a walking trail, or storm drainage. 
The extent of an express easement is determined by the granting language of the 
easement, which a court may not enlarge beyond its express terms. "A right of way 
founded on a deed or grant is limited to the uses and extent fixed by the instrument. 
Where the language of the grant leaves no doubt as to its meaning, there is no discretion 
in the trial court to expand the terms of the easement." Labrum v. Rickenbach, 711 P.2d 
225, 227 (Utah 1985); see also 4-34 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.12 ("Once the 
easement has been delineated . . . by the language of the instrument creating the easement 
. . . it is generally regarded as fixed"); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 482 ("[T]he extent 
of an easement created by conveyance is fixed by the conveyance"). 
In the instant case, the trial court did not discuss or give credence to the explicit 
language in the Smith Judgment that Utah Lake Irrigation could only "take and acquire 
3
 If the Court holds that the vesting documents for Reaches 16-18 are not easements, but 
instead contain restrictive covenants requiring the land to be used for canal purposes, the 
Court should conclude that the Municipal Parties' expanded use of the former canal land 
violates those covenants. See The View Condominium Owners Ass'n v. MS1CO, L.L.C., 
2005 UT 91, ffi| 24-25, 127 P.3d 697 (requiring that restrictive covenants be enforced 
according to their terms). 
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and have for its use for a right of way for its canal and for the construction, operation and 
perpetual maintenance of said canal." Similarly, the trial court did not analyze the 
conveyance language in the Crosgrove Grants stating that Reaches 16 and 17 were to be 
used "for canal purposes only," or the language from the Crane Judgment commanding 
that Reach 18 be condemned "for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a canal 
thereon." 
The trial court skipped the essential first inquiry in determining whether a 
proposed use exceeds the scope of the easement: the court failed to determine the use for 
which the easements were granted, and whether the proposed uses (a culinary pipeline, 
storm drainage, and walking trail) conform to the use granted by the express easement. 
Instead, the district court simply ruled that the Municipal Parties' "use is reasonable, 
given the need for modernization, and does not pose an excessive burden." (R.l 866). In 
so doing, the trial court disregarded the vital analysis of whether a particular use is within 
the scope of an express easement. See The Villager Condominium Ass 'n, Inc. v. Idaho 
Power Co., 829 P.2d 1335 (Idaho 1992) (holding that even though a change in an 
easement relocating underground cables above-ground might not result in an 
unreasonably increased burden on the underlying owner's property, it was an 
impermissible change in use). 
According to the express granting clauses of the granting documents, the strips of 
land in Reaches 16 and 17 were to be used for canal purposes only. According to the 
express terms of the recorded judgments, the strips of land in Reaches 18 and 19 were to 
be used for the construction and maintenance of a canal. The only permissible purpose 
for the lands taken for the applicable reaches was for a canal - not for anything else. 
While a dominant estate holder may upgrade the easement to account for modern 
technologies, it may not change the use fixed by the express granting language. 4-34 
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.12 (stating that although courts allow an easement to 
be expanded to take into account technological innovations, that "expansion of use of the 
easement[] does not permit a change in use not reasonably foreseeable at the time of 
establishment of the easement"); see Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1542-43 (holding that where 
an easement was granted for the purpose of maintaining and operating a railroad for 
public use, that easement could not be used for a public recreational biking and hiking 
trail, and noting that "[i]t is difficult to imagine that either party to the original transfers 
had anything remotely in mind that would resemble a public recreational trail"); Stew-Mc 
Dev., Inc. v. Fischer, 770N.W.2d 839, 847-48 (Iowa 2009) (holding that allowing 
easement originally granted for access to farm properties to be a road for major 
residential development was a change in use that could not have been within the 
contemplation of the parties when it was initially granted, and therefore, exceeded the 
easement's scope). 
At the time of the original grants, a canal was defined as an "artificial channel 
filled with water and designed for navigation, or for irrigating land, etc." Webster's 
Dictionary (1913). Utah law recognized that eminent domain power could be exercised 
for "reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the 
use of the inhabitants of any county, or incorporated city or town." 2 Compiled Laws of 
the State of Utah, § 3588(3) (1907). Utah law thus clearly recognized that land could be 
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taken for canals (the primary purpose of which would be navigation or irrigation) or for 
pipes for conducting water (the primary purpose of which would be to conduct water to 
people). If Reaches ] 6 through 19 were intended to be for canal use or for pipes for 
conducting water for the use of the inhabitants in nearby municipalities or for storm 
drainage or for a public recreational walking trail, the granting language could have and 
would have stated as much. See Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City, 951 
P.2d 735, 735 (Utah 1997) (if parties intended argued conclusion, they would have said 
so, and the court will not "make a better contract for the parties than they have made for 
themselves"). Instead, the plain language of the granting documents provided that the 
land was to be used only for canal purposes, and for the express purpose of constructing 
and maintaining a canal - not for an aqueduct, pipe, drain, or walking trail. 
To the extent that there is any ambiguity or uncertainty in the meaning of "canal" 
at the time the easements for Reaches 16 through 19 were conveyed, the Court may look 
to the subsequent behavior of the parties to clarify what was meant by "for canal 
purposes only." See 4-34 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.12 ("When a conveyance is 
unclear as to the scope of the intended easement, the subsequent behavior of the parties 
can constitute a practical construction furnishing the missing details"). In this case, 
Draper Irrigation used the canal solely for the purpose of delivering irrigation water to its 
shareholders for most of the twentieth century. (R.2295-96). Draper Irrigation affirmed 
in legal documents that the canal property was used "for the purpose of conveying 
irrigation water to its shareholders, and for no other purpose." (R.346.) Draper Irrigation 
treated the canal property as a waterway for irrigation purposes for the duration of its 
interest in the canal property—not as a route for drinking water pipes or for storm runoff 
or as a recreational hiking trail. 
Appellants do not dispute that an easement holder may make modifications to 
upgrade technology and to make processes more efficient, assuming they do not place 
any unreasonable burden on the servient tenement. The easement holder may not, 
however, use the easement for a different purpose than what was granted. A railroad that 
has an easement "for railroad purposes only" may not successfully convey that easement 
to an entity that paves the tracks to make a highway, even though the purpose for both the 
railroad and the highway is to transfer goods and people at high speeds, and even though 
the highway is now the more common, modern method of transport. A railroad is not a 
highway, and to allow the highway to be constructed would change the use of the 
easement that was granted. This is true, regardless whether some may view the change as 
ameliorating the property or benefitting the community at large. See Preseault, 100 F.3d 
at 1541-44 (disallowing the government's building a hiking trail over old railroad tracks 
without condemning the property anew for that purpose); Villager Condominium Ass 'n, 
829 P.2d at 1338 ("Although [the change in easement] may have benefitted Idaho Power 
by reasons of safety, maintenance, and repair . . . that finding did not suffice to permit 
Idaho Power's unauthorized expansion of [the] easement"). 
Similarly, although both canals and pipes transport water, a canal and an enclosed 
culinary water pipe are not the same use, and transported irrigation water and storm 
drainage are not the same use. A canal and a recreational hiking trail are certainly not the 
same use. Metro did not merely make reasonable modifications to the canal to account 
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for technology. Instead, it changed the very use of the easement. But to do so lawfully, 
Metro would have had to buy or condemn the reaches in eminent domain for these new 
uses, paying just compensation for their new easements. 
The district court incorrectly analyzed the scope issue by ignoring the important 
first step. This Court's analysis should correct that error. 
B. Utah case law permitting easement holders to improve the methods by 
which they convey water does not apply to this case because those cases 
involve only a change in method of transport, not a change in the use of 
the easement. 
Instead of analyzing whether Metro's use of the property went beyond the use of 
the express easement, the district court analyzed whether this new use "is reasonable, 
given the need for modernization, and does not pose an excessive burden." (R.l 866). 
The district court relied on "cases cited by the District permitting reasonable modification 
and improvement of canals, including enclosure, as has occurred in this case." (R.l 866). 
Those decisions, Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148 (Utah 1946) 
{"Moyle 77"), and Vakarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998), are readily 
distinguishable from this case because they do not involve a change in use. 
In the Moyle decision, the plaintiff irrigation company sought to cement and 
waterproof ditches within its easement to avoid a loss of water. See Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 159 P.2d 596, 596 (Utah 1945) {"Moyle F). The plaintiff had 
obtained a prescriptive easement to construct and maintain its water distribution system. 
Id. at 597. The Court held that the plaintiff did "not propose to change the purpose of the 
use" of the prescriptive easement, which would "still be to course water through its 
ditches and canals," but that the plaintiffs changes would merely make the ditches 
impervious to water and accelerate the current of the water. Id. at 599. The improvement 
was merely to conserve water, not to change the general use of the ditch's function as a 
water distribution system. Moyle 77, 174 P.2d at 158. Nothing in that holding would 
suggest that the easement holder may change the use of its easement. Rather, the plaintiff 
could merely use technology to improve the easement for its already established purpose. 
In Valcarce, the Court held that the defendant had acquired a prescriptive 
easement to carry irrigation water in a ditch across the plaintiffs' land. 961 P.2d at 312-
13. The defendant installed PVC pipe in the irrigation ditch to carry the water more 
efficiently across the land. Id. at 313. The Court held that the "improvement to the ditch 
enhances both the conveyance and the conservation of the water without materially 
changing the burden or adding any additional burdens to the [servient] estate." Id. The 
Court noted: "We held in Moyle that an easement acquired by an irrigation company/or 
the purpose of carrying irrigation water in ditches across the defendants' land included 
the right to improve the method of carrying the irrigation water for reasons of water 
conservation." Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 313 (emphasis added). In other words, the use of 
the easement did not change: before the improvement, the ditch was used to carry 
irrigation water to the defendant's land, and after the improvement, the ditch was used to 
carry irrigation water to the defendant's land. Notably, the easement was a prescriptive 
easement, so the Court was not bound in any way to express, deeded language—the 
Court had but to focus on the purpose for transporting the water. 
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The instant case is different from Movie and Valcarce. Unlike those prescriptive 
easement cases, the Municipal Parties here are bound by express granting language in the 
easement documents that requires the land in Reaches 16 through 19 be used for canal 
purposes only. Unlike those cases, where the easement holders transported water for the 
same purpose before and after the modification to the method of carrying the irrigation 
water, the Municipal Parties in this case changed the easement from an open canal 
historically used to transport irrigation water for agricultural uses to a buried drinking 
water pipeline transporting water to people for household use (including constructing 
large concrete structures that act as air valve structures necessary for those pipelines); to a 
storm drain channel for runoff; and as a public walking trail. These changes are not 
countenanced by the cases relied on by the district court. The lower court's analysis is 
legally flawed. 
C. The district court failed to follow and apply this Court's controlling 
precedent. 
In Moyle 7, this Court undertook a three-part analysis to determine whether lining 
a canal with concrete amounted to a change in the use of the canal. See Moyle 7, 159 P.2d 
at 598-99. In that decision, Court laid out the following test:4 
In ascertaining whether a particular use is permissible under an easement. . 
. a comparison must be made between such use and the use by which the 
easement was created with respect to: 
Unlike the easements at issue in the instant case, the easements in Moyle and Valcarce 
were created by prescription. The difference in the creation of the easements was not 
addressed by the court below. Although this Court should apply the law regarding 
express easements to the facts of this case, these arguments are equally valid regardless 
whether the law of express or prescriptive easements is applied. 
(a) their physical character 
(b) their purpose 
(c) the relative burden caused by them upon the servient tenement. 
Id. The MoyJe J court concluded that, by proposing to line the canal with cement, the 
irrigation company in that case did "not propose to change the purpose of the use." ]d. 
Only then did the Court determine whether the proposed physical change would unduly 
burden the servient estate. Id. 
In the instant case, the district court did not undertake such a comparison in 
determining whether a subterranean pipeline conforms with the use for which the original 
easements were granted. The court only considered a single factor - the burden on the 
servient estate - in making its determination. The other two factors - the physical 
character and purpose - should have been considered as well. 
As to the physical character of the two uses, it is hard to argue that a covered pipe 
is not physically and visually different from an open canal, or that storm drains are not, 
and even more difficult to argue that a recreational walking trail is not. Additionally, the 
historical purpose of carrying water through this canal (irrigation) is not the same as the 
purpose of transporting different types of water for other uses, such as drinking or runoff 
control. These prongs favor the landowners here. 
The court below did not address either of these two prongs of the test. The court 
simply "conclude[d] that there is no legal or factual support for the Plaintiffs' position 
that the easement with respect to Reach 19 must be limited to irrigation purposes only." 
(R.1866). But as discussed herein, the law from the time period in which the grants of 
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easement were made clearly demonstrates that a canal was considered a different use than 
a pipe. See supra Part LB, infra. Moreover, there is ample factual basis for the 
contention that the canal was intended to be used solely for the purpose of conducting 
irrigation water. In a contract with Salt Lake County allowing discharge of storm water 
into the canal, Draper Irrigation Company, Metro's predecessor-in-interest to the former 
canal land, declared that it owned and operated its canals "for the purpose of conveying 
irrigation water to its shareholders, and for no other purpose'' (R.346) (emphasis added). 
Although it is unnecessary to look outside of the documents to determine the purpose of 
an easement for a canal, the historical use of the canal indisputably supports the 
conclusion that canal water was used for irrigation - not culinary or storm water. 
Courts over the years have held that replacing an open canal with a covered pipe is 
inconsistent with an easement for an open ditch crossing a servient estate. See, e.g., 
White Bros. & Crum Co. v. Watson, 117 P. 497, 499 (Wash. 1911) ("A pipe line cannot 
be substituted for a ditch and flume, nor the right of way changed or lengthened. As to 
these things the authorities are uniform"); Oliver v. Agasse, 64 P. 401, 401-02 (Cal. 1901) 
(holding that replacing an open ditch that followed an easement across plaintiffs 
property with a pipe was an impermissible change in the servitude); Allen v. San Jose 
Land & Water Co., 28 P. 215 (Cal. 1891); Lunn v. Schmidt, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 8840 
at * 12 (Ohio Ct. App., Oct. 17, 1985) ("The plaintiffs correctly state the general rule that 
neither the dominant landowner nor the servient landowner may materially alter the 
easement without the consent of both parties. The placing of closed pipe in a drainage 
ditch, constitutes a material alteration") (citing Hollosy v. Gershkowitz, 88 Ohio App. 
] 98 (Ohio 1950)) (emphasis added). In the Allen decision, the California Supreme Court 
held that substituting an underground pipe for an open canal extinguished the easement: 
The only question remaining is, whether defendants' easement to conduct 
water in an open ditch over plaintiffs' land is substantially altered by 
placing a covered pipe line in the ground in lieu thereof. Will the terms of a 
grant for an open ditch of water be satisfied by laying an underground pipe 
line? We are clearly satisfied to the contrary, and that such a course, if 
continued, would result in an extinction of the easement, and the creation of 
a servitude upon plaintiffs' land different in kind from the one previously 
existing there. 
28 P. at 216. 
This Court has previously held that the reasoning in Allen does not apply in Utah 
because the need for water conservation is greater here than in California. See Moyle JJ, 
174 P.2d at 159. In the instant case, however, the primary purpose for the change is not 
water conservation but a different primary use altogether, distinguishing this Court's 
prior treatment of Allen. The Allen reasoning should be followed to the extent it supports 
the conclusion already established in Utah law that an easement holder may not change 
the basic use of the easement. 
Once the character of the easement has been fixed, "no material change or 
enlargement of the right acquired can be made if thereby a greater burden is placed on the 
servient estate." Moyle 7, 159 P.2d at 597. In this case, the character of the easements for 
Reaches 16 through 19 were fixed long ago - the easements were for canal purposes 
only. To allow Metro to change the canal to a culinary water pipeline and a recreational 
hiking trail with additional, burdensome concrete fixtures on the landowners' very 
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doorsteps, is to change the use. and for that. Metio must buy the land or take it in eminent 
domain if it can 
In sum, the district court erred m holding that Metro's expanded use of the land for 
markedly different purposes does not exceed the scope of the easements, which expressly 
allow use for canal purposes only This Court should reverse 
III. The lower court erred by granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the 
Municipal Parties when clear and convincing record evidence supported the 
abandonment claim. 
The district court entered summary judgment on the landowners' claim that 
Draper Irrigation abandoned its interests in the canal m the early 1990s when it stopped 
flowing irrigation water through the canal. (R.1867). The lower court ruled that "[t]he 
undisputed facts in this case indicate that while irrigation flow may have ceased in 1995 
[sic], the Canal has continuously been utilized for storm water drainage"; and, 
consequently, that the Reach 19 easement had not been abandoned. Reversal is required 
on this record. 
Summary judgment is only appropriate if the material facts are undisputed and the 
law entitles the moving party to a judgment. See Poteet v. White, 2006 UT 63, ]^ 1, 147 
P.3d 439. Evidence in the record demonstrates that Draper Irrigation relocated the 
easement for irrigation purposes, and affirmatively stated that it was abandoning the 
pumping station that delivered water for Reaches 16 through 19. This evidence, in 
combination with the record evidence showing that the canal had fallen into complete 
5
 If the Court holds that Metro exceeded the scope of its rights on Reaches 16-19, as 
argued in Part II supra, the Court need not reach the abandonment issue discussed in this 
Part III. 
disrepair from non-use. is clear and convincing evidence of abandonment that precludes 
judgment as a matter of law when viewed most favorably to the landowners. 
"An easement may be extinguished by an act of the owner of the easement which 
is incompatible with the existence of the right claimed." Brown v. Oregon Short Line 
R.R., 102 P. 740, 742 (Utah 1909). Once the easement has been abandoned, it is 
extinguished and "can never be revived but by a new grant." Jd. Clear and convincing 
evidence is required to show that the owner intended to abandon the easement and 
committed acts in furtherance of such intent. Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder, 
567 P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977). Where an easement was acquired by express grant or 
conveyance, mere non-use of the easement is insufficient to abandon the easement; 
instead, it must be evident that the grantee actually intended to abandon the easement. 
Id.; see also Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375 P.2d 762, 765 (Utah 1962) (requiring proof that 
the easement holder "ceased to use [an] easement to irrigate their land with the intention 
to make no further use of it"). 
In this case, appellants introduced clear and convincing evidence that Draper 
Irrigation intended to abandon the canal easement. 
First, Draper Irrigation stated and evidenced its affirmative intent to abandon 
Reaches 16 through 19 of the canal. Draper Irrigation constructed separate facilities in a 
different easement for its irrigation pipelines, affirmatively and unequivocally stated that 
it would abandon the facilities necessary to deliver water through Reaches 16-19, and 
stipulated that the canal was not constructed, engineered, or used for storm purposes. 
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It is undisputed that Draper Irrigation ceased flowing irrigation water through the 
canal's open ditch by 1995 at the latest; the plaintiffs' evidence shows Draper Irrigation 
ceased flowing water in 1993. (R.903, R.1003, R.l 103, R.1216, R.1221). It is also 
undisputed that Draper Irrigation constructed underground irrigation water pipelines 
across other parts of the canal property away from the subject reaches, but did not install 
the pipelines across Reaches 16 through 19. (R.903, R.l 104). Instead, Draper Irrigation 
filed a document entitled "Application for Permanent Change of Water" with the State 
Engineer. (R.l 158). 
The Permanent Change Application openly stated that Draper Irrigation would use 
the same points of diversion and re-diversion for its new pipeline system, with "the 
exception of the Draper Irrigation-Sandy Canal Pumping Station on the East Jordan 
Canal, which will be abandoned." (R.l 161) (emphasis added). That pumping station is 
the structure necessary to deliver water into Reaches 16 through 19 of the canal. 
(R.l 106). Draper Irrigation changed the point of re-diversion from the East Jordan Canal 
into the Draper Irrigation System, which pumped water into the open Draper canal, and 
firmly stated that the old re-diversion, which pumped water into the open Draper canal, 
would "be abandoned, and a new, second point of diversion [would] be established." 
(R.1114,R.1162, R.1164). 
In November 1998, Draper Irrigation recorded a self-titled "Notice of Interest," 
five years after it had ceased using the canal, in which it asserted a continued ownership 
interest in all property within "the South Branch of the Draper Irrigation Company 
Canal." (R.428-054 through -067). There would be no need for such a unilateral and 
gratuitous recording if Draper Irrigation had continually used the canal during the 
preceding years. 
Draper Irrigation stipulated in 1975 that it owned and operated the canal "for the 
purpose of providing imgation water to its shareholders, and for no other purpose," and 
further that the canals were "constructed and engineered to handle irrigation water in 
specified amounts but were not constructed or engineered to serve as flood control 
channels." (R.346). When Draper Irrigation ceased to use Reaches 16 through 19 for 
imgation purposes, and further stated its express intent to abandon those reaches for such 
purposes, it abandoned its easements in Reaches 16 through 19. 
In Brown v. Oregon Short Line Railroad, this Court held that although mere non-
use of an express easement is not abandonment of the easement, the easement "may 
nevertheless be lost or extinguished" by "an act of the owner which is incompatible with 
the existence of the right claimed." 102 P. at 742. For example, where a highway is 
vacated, the land within the highway is "discharged" of the encumbrance resting thereon 
by easement. Id. at 743 (citing Jackson v. Hathaway, 15 Johns. 447 (N.Y. 1818). In 
Brown, an easement was granted for purposes of ingress and egress to and from a public 
street, but after trees were removed that no longer necessitated the easement, the 
easement had been abandoned and became extinguished. Id. 
Similarly in this case, the sole purpose for which Draper Irrigation constructed and 
maintained the canal - for irrigation purposes - was extinguished when Draper Irrigation 
built irrigation pipelines at a distance from Reaches 16 through 19. Draper Irrigation's 
constructing an alternate pipeline path was "an act of the owner which is incompatible 
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with the existence of the right claimed." See id. at 742. Furthermore. Draper Irrigation's 
own writien statements that it planned to permanently abandon the pumping station for 
Reaches 16 through 19 constitute evidence that it actually intended to abandon the 
easement for Reaches 16 through 19. See Western Gateway Storage Co.. 567 P.2d at 
182. 
In its decision below, the lower court did not evaluate Draper Irrigation's 
statements that it planned to abandon Reaches 16 through 19 of the canal for irrigation 
purposes - the only purpose for which Draper Irrigation had used the canal. (R.902). 
The court also failed to consider the fact that Draper Irrigation had constructed another 
water pipeline that negated the use of the easement over Reaches 16 through 19. The 
district court did not address this evidence at all. Such evidence constitutes clear and 
convincing proof of intent to abandon and acts in furtherance thereof. To ignore it on 
summary judgment was reversible error. 
Second, record evidence shows that Draper Irrigation ceased to use the canal 
property, allowed the property to return to its natural state, and wholly left the 
maintenance and cleanup of the canal property to the adjacent property owners. The non-
use of an easement created by a deed, in connection with other facts, can constitute 
evidence of an intent to abandon. See Brown, 102 P. at 742. Appellants presented 
evidence that in 1993, Draper Irrigation stopped cleaning or maintaining Reaches 16 
through 19, and otherwise ceased to use the canal in any capacity, forcing the property 
owners instead to manage and care for the property. (R.l 115). 
After Draper Irrigation ceased its use of the canal, trees grew and wetlands 
developed, the property returned to its natural state, and the property owners were left to 
clean out trash, debris, and silt, all over the course of at least five years. (R. 1192, 1215-
1216, 1221, 1224). The former canal even housed an abandoned car. (R.l 192, 1215, 
1221, 1225). While this evidence alone may be insufficient to establish abandonment, it 
further supports Draper Irrigation's statements regarding abandonment and the 
construction of other irrigation water delivery facilities. Such combination of events 
distinguishes this case from Western Gateway, where there were no statements of an 
intent to abandon, and there was "clear evidence that [the easement] was used, [and was] 
presently in a condition [which allowed] continued use." Western Gateway, 567 P.2d at 
182. It also distinguishes this case from Harmon, where there was only weak evidence 
that suggested that the easement holders failed to use the irrigation ditch for more than 
one successive year. Harmon, 375 P.2d at 766. 
The lower court relied heavily on its finding that the canal had been utilized for 
storm water drainage. (R.l 867). But the evidence establishes that Draper Irrigation had 
previously never intended or used the canal for storm drainage purposes; and its 
predecessor-in-interest, Utah Lake Irrigation, certainly never obtained property rights for 
that purpose. Furthermore, Draper Irrigation considered storm drainage an interference 
with its use of the property, discussing in a 1989 report the ways in which any such 
drainage would make it difficult to use and maintain the canal. (R.l 143). Draper 
Irrigation did not intentionally use the storm water for any purpose when transporting 
irrigation water to its shareholders. Moreover, the mere presence of storm water flowing 
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naturally through the canal does not evince an indisputable intent by Draper Imgaiion to 
use the canal for that purpose, especially in light of its own prior statements - and 
certainly not as a matter of law on this record. 
Furthermore, use of the property for storm drainage is not use of the property for 
canal purposes. In 2001, Draper Irrigation purported to convey to Draper City the canal 
property "for use as a public trail and for storm drainage purposes." (R.383). By its 
terms, this conveyance did not convey the property "for canal purposes," which was the 
sole purpose for which Reaches 16 through 19 were conveyed. Importantly, by the time 
Draper Irrigation conveyed the property to Draper City, it had already abandoned 
Reaches 16 through 19 and was transporting its irrigation water via a different route. 
In sum, strong record evidence of a clear and convincing nature exists that Draper 
Irrigation abandoned the canal before it transferred its rights to Draper City. The district 
court erred on this record in entering summary judgment against the landowners in light 
of that evidence. This Court should correct that error and reverse and remand. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court should be reversed. 
The original rights obtained were limited rights-of-way for Utah Lake Irrigation's 
irrigation canal. The uses employed by the Municipal Parties today far exceed that scope. 
In all events, Utah Lake Irrigation's successor-in-interest, Draper Irrigation, abandoned 
its rights on Reaches 16-19 when it relocated its canal - or so a reasonable jury could 
find. This case should be remanded to the district court for further proceedings necessary 
to implement this Court's reversal of the judgment. 
DATED this 25 day of Ociober, 2010. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
By: 
Stephen K. Christiansen 
Kelley M. Marsden 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ERIC STERN, an individual, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
et al., 
CASE NO. 050911529 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF 
SALT LAKE & SANDY, a Utah Public 
Works Government Entity, et al., 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on November 8, 2007, 
in connection with the plaintiffs' Motion for Order to Reinstate 
Plaintiffs' Counts II, III, IV of Complaint or in the Alternative Leave 
to Amend Complaint; Metropolitan Water District's (the "District") Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavits filed by the District in support 
of its Motion for Summary Judgment. At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the Court took the matter under advisement to further consider the 
parties' written submissions, the relevant legal authority and counsel's 
oral argument. Being now fully advised, the Court rules as stated 
herein. 
STERN V. METROPOLITAN 
WATER DISTRICT PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The factual background of this matter involves the construction of 
an aqueduct through the Draper Canal. The canal is divided into 
"reaches," with Reaches 16 through 19 being at issue in this case. 
The undisputed facts with respect to each of the Reaches at issue 
can be summarized as follows: 
Reach 16 is currently owned by plaintiffs Costanza. Title to Reach 
16 originated with a 1914 Warranty Deed ("Crosgrove Warranty Deed I") 
from Baynard and Matilda Crosgrove to Utah Lake Irrigation Company 
("ULIC"). The granting clause of the Warranty Deed I "conveys and 
warrants'7 to ULIC the .51 acre tract of land now referred to as Reach 16. 
Reach 17 is currently owned by plaintiffs Stern and Richins. 
(Richins owns property on the west side of Reach 17 and Sterns owns 
property on the east side of Reach 17) . Title to Reach 17 originates 
from a 1914 Warranty Deed from the Crosgroves ("Crosgrove Warranty Deed 
II") to ULIC. The granting clause of Warranty Deed II "conveys and 
warrants" to ULIC the .48 acre tract of land now referred to as Reach 17 
of the canal. Both Crosgrove Warranty Deed I and II contain similar 
provisions regarding construction of bridges, flumes and the use of the 
property for "canal purposes only." 
Reach 18 is currently owned by plaintiff Berolatti. (Berolatti owns 
property on the west side of Reach 18) . Title to Reach 18 originates 
with a Judgment in Condemnation against Susannah Crane, et. al. ("Crane 
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Decree"). The Crane Decree was recorded in 1914 and states that ULIC 
shall ''take, acquire and have for its use in fee the land hereinafter 
described . . ." and finding that the property was taken for public use. 
The Crane Judgment was based upon a Stipulation indicating that "a decree 
of condemnation may be entered herein, condemning in fee to plaintiff the 
property described for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a 
canal over the same. . ." 
Plaintiff Cummings owns property on the west side of Reach 19 and 
claims ownership to the center line of the canal. Title to Reach 19 
originates with a 1915 Decree in Condemnation against Elida Smith ("Smith 
Decree") declaring that ULIC shall "take and acquire and have for its use 
a right of way for its canal and for the construction, operation and 
perpetual maintenance of said canal all matters pertaining thereto for 
its successful operation into and over the following described tract of 
land. . ." 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the District first addresses the 
plaintiffs' Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action (pertaining to the scope 
of the District's property rights in Reaches 16 and 17) and its 
Counterclaim to quiet title in Reaches 16 and 17. The District argues 
that it obtained fee title to Reaches 16 and 17 based on the Crosgrove's 
Warranty Deeds I and II. 
The plaintiffs have asserted that these Warranty Deeds intended to 
limit ULICs use of the land "for canal purposes only." However, the 
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District interprets this language as a covenant between grantor and 
grantee which did not affect the conveyance of title and which would not 
run with the land. It argues that this language did not create any 
reservations that would defeat the conveyance of a fee estate. 
The District further argues that the fact that none of the existing 
adjoining properties overlap Reaches 16 and 17 of the canal supports the 
interpretation of the Deeds as creating a fee simple interest in a 
separate tract of land and not a mere easement over property retained by 
Cosgroves. The District points to Exhibit 4, attached to its supporting 
Memorandum, as demonstrative evidence that the canal is identified as 
separate from the plaintiffs' properties and that the plaintiffs' 
properties do not include or overlap the canal. 
The District's alternative argument is that if the language "for 
canal purposes only" is construed to create a restrictive covenant, then 
the use of the canal for an aqueduct falls within the scope of this 
purpose. 
Next, the District is seeking summary judgment as to Reach 18 on the 
grounds that its predecessors obtained fee simple title to Reach 18. The 
Crane Judgment/Decree from which title to Reach 18 originates 
specifically states ULIC takes the canal property "in fee . . ." The 
Stipulation underlying this Decree reiterates that a decree may be 
entered "condemning in fee" the canal property. The District asserts 
that the language in the Decree pertaining to the construction of flumes, 
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maintaining a bridge over the canal, prohibiting the deposit of materials 
on the banks of the canal, etc., are merely personal covenants. 
Alternatively, the District argues that if the Court determines that 
Crane Decree created only an easement, then the purpose of the 
condemnation ("constructing and maintaining a canal") is broad enough to 
encompass the District's use of the canal for the aqueduct. 
As to Reach 19, the District concedes (for purposes of its Motion) 
that its rights are limited to an easement. However, the District 
disputes the plaintiffs' position that this easement is limited to a 
"rural canal to accommodate only agrarian uses limited to irrigation and 
watering of livestock . . . " The District is urging an interpretation 
of the Smith Decree to allow the District to transport water through an 
underground pipe, as well as through an open canal. The District has 
cited a number of legal authorities indicating that easements are 
interpreted in the same way as contracts and that the scope of an 
easement is determined by reviewing the document creating the easement. 
Applying these legal authorities, the District suggests that the 
Smith Decree' s use of the term "canal" was intended to include 
underground pipes that transport water. According to the District, the 
definition of "canal" and the use of that word at the time the easement 
was conveyed (1915) included underground pipes that transport water. 
During oral argument, the District emphasized that the word "canal" in 
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the Decree was not modified by "irrigation" or "open" and that the 
definition of "canal" is synonymous with aqueduct. 
The District also cites Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 
(Utah 1998), holding that a canal easement owner could install a pipe in 
order to more efficiently transport water. The court indicated that the 
easement owner had a "right to improve the method of carrying the 
irrigation water." The District argued during oral argument that this 
opinion stands for the proposition that Utah is an arid place and that 
the law assumes the parties knew of this nature and the need for 
modernization. 
Similarly, in Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Movie, 174 P.2d 
148, 161 (Utah 1946), the court held that improvements to the canal were 
within the scope of the easement and that while there may be "additional 
burdens" on the servient estate, the easement owner had an interest in 
water conservation. Specifically, the removal of trees existing on the 
water banks of the canal was not a sufficient burden to prevent lining 
the canal with cement. 
Overall, the District argues that an easement is a "living, evolving 
thing." While recognizing the countervailing principle that the change 
in the method of using the easement must be reasonable and not an 
excessive burden on the servient estate, the District maintains that 
constructing of the aqueduct is reasonable and has actually served to 
alleviate problems with drowning risk, odors and insects, which the 
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plaintiffs previously complained about. In addition, the District points 
out that the plaintiffs regain use of the surface of the canal. 
Finally, the District is seeking summary judgment as to the 
plaintiffs' negligence and equitable estoppel claims. As to the 
equitable estoppel claim, the District denies that it made any statements 
or engaged in conduct inconsistent with its right to use the canal as an 
aqueduct. As to the negligence claim, the District argues that the 
plaintiffs cannot establish that it has exceeded the scope of its 
easement rights in the canal. 
The plaintiffs' Opposition and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
counter that the District's predecessor, ULIC, acquired limited rights 
in the form of restrictive easements for construction and maintenance of 
a canal for irrigation purposes. The plaintiffs look to the language in 
the various deeds and decrees which restrict the use of the land for 
canal purposes. Even in the case of the Crane Decree (Reach 18), the 
plaintiffs suggest that the use of the term "fee" is "misleading" because 
ULIC was only seeking to acquire an easement. 
The plaintiffs also deny that the easements granted to ULIC included 
the building of an aqueduct. They point out that ULIC was in the 
business for irrigation and that the parties' intent was to limit the 
purpose of the easements to irrigation of the land. 
The plaintiffs have also advanced an abandonment argument. While 
the plaintiffs' abandonment claim was previously dismissed, voluntarily, 
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they are now seeking to reinstate it, along with their adverse possession 
and prescriptive easement claims. 
Having considered the parties' respective legal positions in light 
of the relevant conveyance documents, the Court determines that the 
issues in this case center on whether the limitations expressed in the 
relevant conveyance documents are limitations on interest or simply 
personal covenants and, if an easement has been created, whether the 
District's use of the canal for aqueduct purposes falls within the scope 
of the easement contemplated. 
With respect to Reach 18, the Crane Judgment specifically refers to 
the property as being conveyed "in fee." The underlying Stipulation 
similarly authorizes a decree "condemning in fee" the property to ULIC. 
Indeed, nowhere in the Crane Judgment or Stipulation is there any 
"easement" or "right of way" language or any other language which would 
suggest a limitation of ULIC s rights in the form of a restrictive 
easement. The Court interprets the terms concerning construction of 
flumes, maintaining a bridge, etc., as being personal covenants and not 
as creating only an easement. 
In assessing the interests held by the District in Reaches 16 and 
17, the Court has carefully construed the Cosgrove Warranty Deeds I and 
II. The Court determines that these were standard warranty deeds that 
"conveyed and warranted" the properties to ULIC. The use of this 
language has been held at common law to imply the granting of a fee, 
STERN V. METROPOLITAN 
WATER DISTRICT PAGE 9 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
unless there is a qualifying clause in the granting language. In order 
to overcome the presumption of a fee, the "one who attacks a deed has the 
burden of proving otherwise by clear and convincing evidence." Jacobsen 
v. Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976). The Court determines that 
the plaintiffs have not overcome this presumption and that the District 
acquired Reaches 16 and 17 in fee simple title. Further, the Court 
concludes that the language in the Deeds providing for the construction 
of bridges and flumes and "for canal purposes only" does not contradict 
the presumption of a fee title being conveyed. To the contrary, given 
the placement of this language, it must be construed as a covenant 
between grantor and grantee, which would not affect or otherwise limit 
the title and which does not bind successive owners. 
With respect to Reach 19, the District has conceded that its rights 
are limited to an easement. The Court determines that the District's use 
of Reach 19 does not exceed the scope of the easement contemplated. This 
use is reasonable, given the need for modernization, and does not pose 
an excessive burden. In reaching this conclusion, the Court was 
persuaded by the cases cited by the District permitting reasonable 
modification and improvement of canals, including enclosure, as has 
occurred in this case. The Court also concludes that there is no legal 
or factual support for the plaintiffs' position that the easement with 
respect to Reach 19 must be limited to irrigation purposes only. 
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The Court notes that as to Reach 19, the plaintiffs have a potential 
abandonment claim (which they have sought to reinstate) . The plaintiffs 
claim that the Draper Irrigation Company abandoned its interests in 1993 
when it stopped flowing irrigation water in the canal. 
The plaintiffs appear to acknowledge that non-use alone is not 
sufficient to prove intent to abandon. As indicated by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375 P.2d 762 (Utah 1962), there must be 
clear and convincing evidence not only of non-use, but also "the 
intention to make no further use of it." Id. at 766. The undisputed 
facts in this case indicate that while irrigation flow may have ceased 
in 1995, the Canal has continuously been utilized for storm water 
drainage. Further, consistent with its ruling above, the Court is not 
persuaded that using the easement with respect to Reach 19 in a manner 
other than for irrigation flow constitutes abandonment. 
Finally, in light of the Court's ruling above, the Court also 
concludes that the plaintiffs' negligence and equitable estoppel claims 
fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the District's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted in the entirety and the plaintiffs' cross-Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment is denied. 
The Court notes that the plaintiffs have also filed a Motion for 
Default Partial Summary Judgment against defendant Draper City on the 
grounds that Draper City did not file an opposition to the plaintiffs' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Draper City responded with a Cross-
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Motion for Summary Judgment re-arguing the issues of fee ownership, 
versus easement as to Reaches 16, 17 and 18. The Court concludes that 
its ruling with respect to the District is dispositive to the issues 
raised in the Motions concerning Draper City. Accordingly, Draper City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
In light of the foregoing rulings, the plaintiffs' Motion to 
Reinstate is denied as being moot. With respect to the Motion to Strike, 
the Court notes that the District previously filed the Affidavits of 
Carman, Stahl and Gardner in 2005 (in connection with the District's 
opposition to the plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction), without objection from the plaintiffs. The 
Court determines that the plaintiffs' current objections to these 
Affidavits have therefore been waived. In addition, the Court notes that 
Mr. Stahl's title opinions were previously received during the 
TRO/Preliminary Injunction hearings. The District has persuasively 
argued that this opinion is now part of the record. Further, having 
considered the plaintiffs' evidentiary objections to portions of Mr. 
Leuttinger's Affidavit, the Court determines that they are without merit 
and therefore denied. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' Motion to Strike is 
denied in the entirety. 
The District also filed a Motion to Strike portions of the 
plaintiffs' Affidavits. The District's Motion primarily asserts that the 
paragraphs at issue are based on hearsay and/or contain legal conclusions 
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or speculation. In response, the plaintiffs have stipulated to striking 
a number of the paragraphs which the District objects to. Rather than 
striking the remaining paragraphs at issue, the Court has considered only 
the admissible portions of these paragraphs and given them the 
appropriate weight. The District's Motion to Strike is therefore denied. 
Counsel for the District and Draper City are instructed to submit 
Orders consistent with this Court's Memorandum Decision and Rule 7(f) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
/ A s 
Dated this % day of February,/2008. 
TYRONE' JE. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
STERN V. METROPOLITAN 
WATER DISTRICT PAGE 13 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision; to the following; this day of 
February; 2008: 
Stanford A. Graham 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
4548 S. Atherton Drive, Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
James I. Watts 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
774 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
W. Cullen Battle 
Rachel G. Terry 
Attorneys for Defendant Metropolitan Water 
District of Salt Lake & Sandy 
215 S. State Street, Twelfth Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
David B. Hartvigsen 
Matthew E. Jensen 
Attorneys for Defendant Draper Irrigation Company 
215 S. State Street, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Douglas J. Ahlstrom 
Draper City Attorney 
1020 E. Pioneer Road 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Todd J. Godfrey 
Attorney for Defendant Draper City 
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
2 
Ueputyaerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ERIC STERN, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF 
SALT LAKE & SANDY, et al. 
Defendants. 
ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No 050911529 
Judge Medley 
The following matters came before the Court for a hearing on November 8, 2007: 
1. Defendant Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, dated April 5, 2007; 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Order to Reinstate Plaintiffs Counts II, III, & IV of 
Complaint or in the Alternative Leave to Amend Complaint, dated May 7, 2007; 
3. Plaintiffs5 Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavits of Jason Luettinger, John R. 
Carman, David Gardner and John Stahl, dated May 7, 2007; 
4. Defendant Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy's Motion to Strike 
Portions of Plaintiffs' Affidavits, dated May 25, 2007; 
5. Defendant Draper Irrigation Company's Joinder in Motion for Summary Judgment 
Filed by Metropolitan Water District, dated May 25, 2007; 
6. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated June 22, 2007; 
7. Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Partial Summary Judgment Against Draper City, 
dated July 20, 2007; and 
8. Defendant Draper City's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, dated July 25, 
2007. 
W. Cullen Battle appeared for Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy (the 
"District"), Todd J. Godfrey appeared for Draper City, David B. Hartvigsen appeared for Draper 
Irrigation Company, and James I. Watts appeared for Plaintiffs. 
Based upon the motions, memoranda, affidavits, prior testimony, other papers in the file, 
and the arguments of counsel, and for the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum 
Decision, dated February 20, 2008, the Court rules on the foregoing motions as follows: 
1. Defendant Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted; 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Order to Reinstate Plaintiffs Counts II, III, & IV of 
Complaint or in the Alternative Leave to Amend Complaint is denied as moot; 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavits of Jason Luettinger, John R. 
Carman, David Gardner and John Stahl is denied; 
4. Defendant Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy's Motion to Strike 
Portions of Plaintiffs' Affidavits is denied; 
5. Plaintiffs5 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied; 
6. Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Partial Summary Judgment Against Draper City is 
denied; and 
7. Defendant Draper City's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
The Court's rulings on the foregoing motions fully resolve all pending claims as between 
the parties, except for the award of costs, Draper City's claim against Plaintiffs for attorneys fees 
relating to the preliminary injunction proceedings, and Plaintiffs Eric and Michaela Stem's claim 
of boundary by acquiescence against Draper City. Upon resolution of these remaining matters, 
or upon certification under Rule 54(b), a final judgment will be entered as follows: 
A. Judgment will be entered in favor of all Defendants on all claims asserted by 
Plaintiffs, except Plaintiffs Eric and Michaela Stern's claim of boundary by acquiescence against 
Draper City, and all such claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
B. Judgment will be entered in favor of Defendant Metropolitan Water District of Salt 
Lake & Sandy (the "District") on its Counterclaim quieting title in the property described in 
Exhibit A, hereto, as Draper Irrigation Canal Reaches 16 through 19 (the "Easement Property") 
and declaring that the District's Non-Exclusive Pipeline Right of Way and Easement Agreement, 
recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder on August 11, 2004" (the "District Easement") is a 
good and valid easement on the Easement Property, that the District is entitled to construct, 
operate and maintain its Aqueduct and to make other uses of the Easement Property as set forth 
in the District Easement, and that Plaintiffs' interests, if any, in the Easement Property are fully 
subordinate and subject to the District Easement. 
C. Judgment will be entered in favor of Defendant Draper City on its Counterclaim 
quieting title in the property described in Exhibit A hereto as Draper Irrigation Canal Reaches 16 
through 18 (the "Fee Property") and declaring that Draper City is the owner of the Fee Property 
in fee simple and that Plaintiffs have no right title or interest is the Fee Property, subject only to 
the final disposition of Plaintiffs Eric and Michaela Stern's claim of boundary by acquiescence. 
Based upon its earlier request, the District's remaining claims against Plaintiffs Eric and 
Michaela Stern are dismissed without prejudice as moot 
EXHIBIT A 
Draper Irrigation Canal Reach 16: 
A tract of land as conveyed by Bayard M Crossgrove and wife Matilda Crossgrove on April 8, 
1914 by Warranty Deed recorded on April 10, 1914 in Book 9-C at Page 116 as Entry No 
323387 in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, said tract of land being more particularly 
described as follows 
Beginning 3914 5 feet North and 2303 6 feet East from the Southwest corner of Section 33, 
fownship 3 South, Range 1 East, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point being on the 
South property line and on the center line of canal, thence a strip of land 3 rods wide extending 2 
rods to the left and 1 rod to the right of the center line of canal, described as follows On a 11°26' 
curve to the right 89 2 feet, thence North 12°37' East 50 feet, thence on a 16°04' curve to the left 
195 7 feet, thence North 18°49' West 1110 feet to the North property line, area 0 51 acres 
Draper Irrigation Canal Reach 17: 
A tract of land as conveyed by Charles M Crossgrove and wife Elizabeth Crossgrove on April 8, 
1914 by Warranty Deed recorded on April 10, 1914 in Book 9-C at Page 115-116 as Entry No 
323386 in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, said tract of land being more particularly 
described as follows 
Beginning 4348 7 feet North and 2280 0 feet East from the Southwest corner of Section 33, 
Township 3 South, Range 1 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point being on the 
South property line and on the center line of canal, thence a strip of land 3 rods wide extending 2 
rods to the left and 1 rod to the right of the center line of canal described as follows North 
18°49' West 349 6 feet to the north property line, area 0 40 acres 
Draper Irrigation Canal Reach 18: 
A tract of land as decreed against Susannah Crane, et al on August 19, 1914 by Stipulated 
Judgment in Condemnation recorded on August 22, 1914 in Book 9-D at Page 424-425 as Entry 
No 329660 in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, said tract of land being more 
particularly described as follows 
Beginning 4679 7 feet North and 2167 2 feet East from the Southwest corner of Section 33, 
Township 3 South of Range 1 East of Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point being on the 
center lme of canal and on the South property line, thence a stnp of land 3 rods wide extending 2 
rods to the left and 1 rod to the nght of the center line of canal descnbed as follows North 
18°49' West 439 4 feet to an East and West fence line, thence a strip of land 40 feet wide 
extending 15 feet to the right and 25 feet to the left of the center line of Canal descnbed as 
follows North 18°49' West 150 feet, thence North 41°16' West 9 7 feet to the North property 
line, area 0 56 acres 
Draper Irrigation Canal Reach 19: 
An easement as decreed against Elida H Smith on July 21, 1915 by Verdict of Jury recorded on 
July 21, 1915m Book 9-Z at Page 54-56 as Entry No 345408 in the office of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder, said easement being more particularly described as follows 
Beginning at a point on the south property line 132 4 feet South and 1958 8 feet East from the 
Southwest corner of Section 28, Township 3 South, Range 1 East of the Salt Lake Base and 
Mendian said point being on the center line of canal, thence a stnp of land 3 rods wide extending 
1 rod to the right and 2 rods to the left of the center line of canal, described as follows North 
41°16" West 435 feet, thence a strip of land 2-1/2 rods wide, extending 1/2 rod to the right and 2 
rods to the left of the center line of canal descnbed as follows On a 15° curve to the right 49 
feet, more or less, to the center line of a north and south street, area 0 54 acres 
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Michael Z Hayes (#1432) 
MAZURAN & HAYES, PC. 
2118 East 3900 South. Suite 300 
Salt Lake City. UT 84124-1725 
Telephone: (801)272-8998 
Fax: (801)272-1551 
Attorneys for Defendant Draper City 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY DISTRICT COURT 
ERIC STERN, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT 
OF SALT LAKE & SANDY, A Utah 
Public Works Entity, et al, 
Defendants 
FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT DRAPER 
CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO 
UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
65A 
Civil No. 050911529 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendant Draper City's (the "City") Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs 
boundary by acquiescence claim and the City's Motion for attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 65 A came before the Court for a hearing on December 14, 2009. Todd J. 
Godfrey and Michael Z. Hayes appeared for Draper City, and James I. Watts and Jared Parkinson 
appeared for Plaintiffs. 
Final Summary Judgment and Order on Defendant Dra 
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Based upon the motions, memoranda, affidavits, prior testimony, other papers on file, and 
the arguments of counsel, and for the reasons set forth by the Court in its oral ruling on 
December 16, 2009, the Court rules on the foregoing motions as follows: 
1. The City's Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' claim for boundary 
by acquiescence is granted. The Court grants the City's motion for the primary reason that the 
boundary by acquiescence claim is barred by the public use doctrine as delineated by the 
argument and cases cited by the City. A secondary reason for granting the City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is that based upon the current state of the evidence there are no material facts 
showing that the City or its predecessors mutually acquiesced in the alleged boundary line. 
2. On the City's Motion for Attorneys' Fees pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
65 A the Court grants judgment against the Plaintiffs in the sum of $ 11,517. The Court finds that 
the City suffered damage from the issuance of the wrongful temporary restraining order by 
incurring attorneys' fees to defend against the issued order and to overturn the order on the 
motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court further finds that such damages are recoverable 
pursuant to Rule 65 A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court has considered the 
supplemental affidavits filed by the City's attorneys and hereby finds that the hourly rates 
charged are customary and in line with rates charged by attorneys in the area; that the time spent 
on the individual tasks performed in defending the temporary restraining order and preliminary 
injunction was reasonable and necessary. The Court further finds that the fees incurred for work 
other than defending the temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction have been 
properly excluded by the City's attorneys and concurrently by the Court. 
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The Court's rulings on the foregoing Motions, together with its previous ruling on the 
prior motion for Summary Judgment brought by the City and Defendant Metropolitan Water 
District of Salt Lake and Sandy fully resolve all pending claims as between the parties. As a 
result, a final summary judgment is hereby entered as follows: 
A. Judgment is entered in favor of all Defendants on all claims asserted by Plaintiffs, 
and all such claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
B. Judgment is entered in favor of Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake and 
Sandy (the "District") on its Counterclaim quieting title in the property described in Exhibit A, 
hereto, as Draper Irrigation Canal Reaches 16 through 19 (the "Easement Property") declaring 
that the District's Non-Exclusive Pipeline Right of Way and Easement Agreement, recorded with 
the Salt Lake County Recorder on August 11, 2004 (the "District Easement") is a good and valid 
easement on the Easement Property, that the District is entitled to construct, operate and maintain 
its Aqueduct and to make other uses of the Easement Property as set forth in the District 
Easement, and that Plaintiffs' interest, if any, in the Easement Property are fully subordinate and 
subject to the District Easement. 
C. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendant Draper City on that portion of 
its Counterclaim seeking quiet title to the property described in Exhibit A thereto as Draper 
Irrigation Canal Reaches 16 through 18 (the "Fee Property") which judgment does hereby quiet 
title in the aforesaid property and establishes that Draper City is the owner of the Fee Property in 
fee simple and that Plaintiffs have no rights title or interest in the Fee Property. 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
James Watts 
David B. Hartvigsen 
W. Cullen Battle 
4 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
James Watts 
W. Cullen Battle 
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APPROVED AX TO FORM: 
David B. Hartvigsen 
W. Cullen Battle 
DATED this 17 day of 
^)w>^) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on theQ day of March, 2010, 1 caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANT DRAPER CITY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES PURSUANT TO UTAH 
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 65A by mailing, postage prepaid, first class United States mail, to 
the following: 
Stanford A. Graham, Esq. 
Stanford A. Graham, PC 
4548 South Atherton Drive, Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Jared G. Parkinson 
Attorney at Law 
623 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
James I. Watts 
James I. Watts, Attorney at Law 
774 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
David B. Hartvigsen 
Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC 
215 South State Street, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
W. Cullen Battle, Jr. 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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742 IRRIGATION A \ D \\ M ER RIGHTS—GENERAL PROVISIONS 
unit of measurement of the \olume of water shall be the acre foot, beinc % amount of water upon an acre covered one foot deep, equivalent to 43 5AA 
cubic feet R S '98 §§ 1282, 1283, '01, p 143, '03, p 101, '05, p 160 
3465. (1288x20.) Beneficial use. Beneficial use shall be the basis, th 
measure and the limit of all rights to the use of water in this state 
R S '98, § 1262, '03, p 101, '05, p 160 
39^ Salt Lake City et al v Gardner et a] 30, 114 P 147 
No land owner is entitled to more
 Wa t from a ditch for any specific purpose than \ 
reasonably necessary to supply his needs f0S 
that purpose regardless of the quantity that 
has been used and the length of use 
Big Cottonwood T D Co v Shurthff _
 T 
—, 164 P 856 b 
Decisions on beneficial use note to § 3450 
The rights of prior appropnators of the 
waters of a lake as against subsequent ap 
pucants to appropriate water therefrom de 
pend not on how much the prior appropnators 
required but on the amount thev have applied 
to an original and beneficial purpose within a 
reasonable time after their appropriation and 
prior to the application of defendants for an 
appropriation 
$fr 3466. (1288x21.) Eminent domain. The use oi water for beneficial 
pmposes, as provided m this title, is herebv declaied to be a public use Any 
person corporation, or association shall have a right ol way across and upon 
public private, and corpoiate lands, or other right of way, for the construc-
tion, maintenance, repair, and use of all necessary reservoirs, dams, water 
gates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, or other means of securing, storing, 
and conveying water for irrigation 01 foi any necessary public use, or for 
diamage, upon payment of just compensation therefor, but such right of 
way shall m all cases be exercised in a mannei not to unnecessarily impair 
the practical use of any other right of way, highway, or public or private 
road, nor to unnecessarily mjuie any public oi pnvate property Such right 
may be acquired m the manner provided by law for the taking of pnvate 
property for public use R S '98, § 1277, '03, p 103, '05, p 160 
Eminent domain generally §§ 7330 7350 
Railroads may take water under power of 
eminent domain, for certain purposes § 1228 
Cities and towns may take water under 
power of eminent domain, § 570x2 
Right of way for ditches etc over state 
lands, § 5616 
Cited m Fuller et al v Sharp et al , 33 TJ. 
431 94 P 813 
The taking of property for the purpose of 
obtaining water for the irrigation of a farm 
and to render the same productive is a taking 
for a public use and hence the owner of the 
farm may condemn a right of way through 
another's ditch for the purpose of carrying 
water to his land for irrigation 
Nash v Clark, 27 TJ 158, 75 P 371, af-
firmed 198 TJ S 361 
Ditch on public land Persons who build an 
irrigation ditch on the public lands of the 
United States become the owners thereof, and 
of the right to use the water first appropriated 
thereby, but when such ditch is enlarged by 
others, the original owners not objecting, the 
parties so enlarging the ditch become owners 
therein and m the water appropriated thereby, 
without any conveyance from the original 
owners 
Lehi Irr Co v Moyle, 4 U 327, 9 P 867 
No title against the government m a person 
taking possession of public land for the pur-
pose of procuring water or digging ditches for 
canals, without the performance of an> T\ork 
thereon 
Bear River Irr Co v Garland, 164 U S 1, 
affirming 9 TJ 350, 34 P 368 
License to construct pipe line not revocable, 
A parol license to enter on the land of the 
owner to construct a pipe line to cany water 
for purposes of irrigation operates as an ir-
revocable grant after entry and the construc-
tion of the pipe line at considerable ei-
pense, and after commencing the use of the 
water for purposes of irrigation and the rights 
acquired under the grant will be protected m 
equity 
Maple Orchard Co v Marshall, tl U 2i5 75 
P 369. 
3467. (1288x22.) Id. Right to enlarge existing canal. When any per-
son, corporation, or association desires to convey water for irrigation or for 
any other beneficial purpose, and there is a canal 01 ditch already constructed 
that can be enlarged to comey the required quantity of water, then such 
person, corporation, oi association, or the owner or owners of the land through 
which a new canal oi ditch would have to be constructed to convey the 
quantity of water necessaiy, shall have the right to enlarge said canal or 
ditch already constructed, by compensating the owner of the canal or ditch 
to be enlarged, for the damage, if any, caused by said enlargement, pionded 
that said enlargement shall be done at any time from the 1st day of October 
to the 1st day of Maich, or at any other time that may be agreed upon with 
the owner of said canal or ditch R S '98, § 1278, '03, p 103, '05, p 160 
Right to enlarge existing canal, note to § 
3466 
For the purpose of conveying water from 
a river for the use of its inhabitants, a city 
may enlarge a canal owned by an lmgation 
company such a use by the city being a 
public one, the owner of the canal may be 
compensated for any damage caused by the 
enlargement, the measure t ' damages therefor 
being tne decrease m value of the canal for 
canal purposes caused by the enlargement, 
and by the joint use 
S L City v East Jordan Irr Co, 40 U ">26, 
121 P 592 
Tanner v Provo Bench Canal & In Co , 40 
U 105, 121 P 584 
It is no objection to the maintenance of 
the proceeding under this section that the 
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the entry of the "judgment within which time the tenant or an> sub tenaDt or 
any mortgagee of the term or other partv interested m its continuance raa\ 
pay into court for the landlord the amount of the judgment and costs and 
thereupon the judgment shall be satisfied and the tenant be restored to his 
estate but if payment, as herein provided be not made within the five da}s 
the judgment ma} be enforced for its full amount, and for the possession of 
the premises In all other cases the judgment ma^ be enforced immediately 
Cal C Civ P § 1174* entry or onlawful detainer i«? entitled to recoA er 
Treble damages for forcible e n t n etc § 3 5 1 0 treble damages
 U T l u 4 f i p u f i 
_ , , , , , , Eccles \ U P Coal Co 15 U 14 48 P 148 A plaintiff ID a case for damages for forcible 
3585 Pleadings verified The complaint and answer must be verified 
Cal C Civ P § 1175 Complaint m justice « court to be verified H 
3685 3724 
3586 Appeal within ten days Undertaking Stay Either party ma}, //o" f% 
within ten days, appeal from the judgment rendered But an appeal by the 
defendant shall not stay the execution of the judgment, unless within said 
ten days, he shall execute and file with the court or justice his undertaking 
to the plaintiff, with two or more sureties, m an amount to be fixed b} the 
court or justice, but which shall be not less than twice the amount of the 
judgment and costs, to the effect that, if the judgment appealed from be 
affirmed or the appeal be dismissed, the appellant will pay the judgment and 
the costs of appeal, the value of the use and occupation of the property, and 
damages justly accruing to the plaintiff during the pendency of the appeal 
Upon taking the appeal and filing the undeitaking all further proceedings m 
the case shall be sta} ed 
Cal C Civ P § 978* Appeal m forcible entry etc same as in other 
Provisions of sections 3747 3748 made apphca c a s e s Tbere is no dist inction between an appeal 
ble to appeals m forcible entry , etc proceed f r o m a j udgment rendered by a justice <= court in 
fugs forcible ent ry and detainer and an appeal from 
Hoffman v Lewis 31 U 87 P 167 a just ice s court in other cases 
* Id 
^ 3587 Civil procedure applicable The provisions of this code, relative 
to civil actions, appeals, and new trials, so far as the> are not inconsistent ^i th 
the provisions of this chapter, apply to the proceedings mentioned m this 
chapter 
Cal C Civ P , § 1177* 
CHAPTER 65. 
EMINENT DOMAIN 3 < ^ < ^ / ^ ^ / £ 
# 3588 Exercised in behalf of what uses Subject to the provisions of ^ ^ 
this chapter, the right of eminent domain may be exercised m behalf of the /7^rpf7i 
tollowmg public uses / 7* / ? *«r 
f 1 All public uses authorized by the government of the United States, 
1
 2 Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other 
P&blic uses authorized by the legislature, 
9* 3 Public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, incorporated 
| % or town, or school district, reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, 
?r pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any county, or 
meorporated city or town, or for draining any county, or incorporated city 
<r 
1164 CIVIL PROCEDLRE—EMINENT DOMAIN 
or town for raising the banks of ^tream^ rernoMug obstructions therefrom 
and widening deepening or straightening their channels for roads streets' 
and alleys, and all other public uses for the benefit of an> count} incorporated' 
citv or town or the inhabitants thereof 
4 Wharves docks piers chutes booms ferries bridges toll roads bv 
roads plank and turnpike roads roads for transportation b} traction engines 
or road locomotives roads for logging or lumbering purposes and railroads 
and street railways for public transportation, 
% 5 Reservoirs dams water gates canals ditches flumes, tunnels, aque 
ducts, and pipes for supplying persons mines mills smelters, or other works 
for the reduction of ores with water for domestic or other uses or for rrri 
gating purposes or for draining and reclaiming lands or for floating logs and 
lumber on streams not navigable, 
^ 6 Roads, railroads tramwa}s tunnels ditches, flumes pipes and dump 
ing places to facilitate the milling smelting or other reduction of ores, or the 
working of mines, quarries or mineral deposits, outlets, natural or otherwise 
for the deposit or conduct of tailings refuse or water from mills, smelters 
or other works for the reduction of ores or from mines, quarries or mineral 
deposits mill dams natural gas or oil pipe lines tanks or reser\oirs, also an 
occupancy m common by the owners or possessors of different mines, quar-
ries, mineral deposits mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores 
of any place for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter, 
7 Byroads leading from highways to residences and farms, 
8 Telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and sites 
for electric light and power plants, 
9 Sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less than 
ten families, or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any col 
lege or university, 
10 Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches flumes aqueducts, and pipes for 
supplying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose 
of generating and transmitting electricity for power, light, or heat, 
11 Cemeteries or public parks, i 
12 Pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids con-
nected with the manufacture of beet sugar Am'd '01, p 19, '07, p 143 ^ 
fa S w i > ' * Cal C Civ P , § 1238* See Sup (1893) p horse rai l roads, held t h a t by irapbcation this 
-995, and Sup (1895) p 33, § 1233* r ight may be exercised in behalf of electncal 
V * E m i n e n t domain for pipes, t anks , etc , for n a t railways 
-oral gas, § 1552 for r ight of way for canals,
 n Ogden City Rai lway Company v Ogden City, 
ditches, e t c , § 1288x21, for rai lroads, for n g h t 7 u 2 { J 7 > 2b F 2 S S 1 
•of way and for water, § 434, sub 3 , for drainage Condemnation of railroad right of way for I 
district , § 767, for city, for water , § 206x2 telegTaph line L a n d which is a par t of a rail-
Proper ty and franchises of pr iva te corporat ions r o a ; d s ? S h t °f way, b u t not used for any purpose 
subject to eminent domain, Con ar t 12, sec 11 and not essential t o t he enjoyment of such rail-
_ i »i , i i i i road s franchise and proper ty , m a y be appro-
Pr iva te proper ty s h $ l no t be t aken or damaged
 p n a t e d t o t h e ^ o f a d u l y m Q p r p o r a t e d telegraph 
for pubhc use wi thouV just compensat ion, Con
 c o m p a ] Q y f o r the purpose of constructing and 
a r t 1, sec 22, and no te mainta ining i ts hnes , since such appropriation: 
No person shall be deprived of p roper ty with- is for a more necessary pubhc use Measure of 
o u t due process of law, Con a r t 1 sec 7, and damages h 
n o t e Postal Tel & C Co v 0 S L R R Co, 23 
Constitutional limitation on power of eminent U 474, 65 P 735 *! 
domain Con art 1, sec 22, providing t h a t p n - A city council cannot authorize a permanent 
v a t e p roper ty shall no t be taken or damaged for pub- switch track, for a private business only along 
he use wi thou t just compensat ion, is a l imitat ion a street and across a sidewalk, from a steam rmk 
•on exercise of power of eminent domain road m the street , to t he de t r iment of people 
Kimbal l v Grantsvil le City, 19 TJ 368, 57 P 1 residing on the s t ree t and to the damage of their 
abut t ing p roper ty , the s t reets being dedicated 
RAILROADS t o pubhc use 
Cereghino v O S L R R C o , 26 U 467j 
Applies to electncal railways Unde r § 3841, 7 3 p 6 3 4 T 
C L 1888, providing t h a t the r ight of eminent A party whose property is" about to be damaged 
•domain m a y be exercised in behalf of s team and in a substant ia l degree for pubhc use is given 
6 
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same remedies as would be accorded him if his t h a t to which the city devotes it, (On rehearing, 
property were actual ly app rop r i a t ed for. public 25 XJ. 456; 71 P . 1069.) 
]
u s / - Salt Lake City v. Wa te r & El . P . Co., 24 U . 
Stockdale v. R. G. W . R y . Co., 28 U. 201; 77 249; 67 P . 672. 
P. S49. Right to enlarge another's irrigation ditch. 
Railroad cannot sub j ec t private property in P roper ty is taken for a public use, within the pro-
a city to burdens to whrch i t wiU b e subjected vision of the const i tut ion declaring t h a t pr ivate 
by .'running of cars and engines over a switch proper ty shall not be t aken for public use with-
]aid over adjoining p rope r ty , w i t h o u t proceed- out just compensation, when the taking is for 
ing under law oi eminen t domain . use t h a t will p romote the public interest , and will 
Id. v tend to develop the resources of the s ta te . In 
this case a r ight of way for an irrigation ditch. 
CANALS, M I N E S , ETC.: Nash v. Clark, 27 U. 158; 75 P . 3 7 1 ; affirmed 
198 U. S. 361. 
Condemnation of public use for another public
 T , „nnArxny„„A r M w ; _ + „ „ * _ „ „ r™ ft „ 
use. Th£ provisions of th i s sect ion a n d §§ 3590,
 +
 L a ? d condemned for mine t r a m w a y The con-
3596, rendeV, under o rd ina ry c i rcumstances ! prop- ? t n \ C * 1 0 I \ ^ f operation of roads and t r amways 
erty appropriated for a publ ic use l iable to con- f o r £ h e development and working of mines is a 
demnation for another publ ic use . ^UTT- CviUSej -D n -mr «-> cu • i i oo TT OI C 
Salt Lake City v. W a t e r & E l . P , Co. ; 24 U. ^ e ^ d 2,-G- ^ ^ V ' £bT&ey. 2 8 U ' 2 1 5 ; 
249- 67 P 672 78 P . 296; affirmed 200 U. S. 525. 
On condemning right to connect with city's ° h a n g e °/ s t + r e e t ^ r a d e after once established 
tanal.- A proceeding b y a p o w r r c o m p a n y under W h e r e , a
 +
s t r e
^ frade, ? « * ^ f b h s h e d b u t no t 
the eminent domain s t a t u t e t o o b t a i n the r ight c a r r ' e d m * ° e f * e c t ' a n d Rafter b m l d i n g £ W e r e 
to connect a flume wi th a c i tv ' s cana l for purpose erected the city was liable for damages resulting 
of discharging wa te r i n t o it , u n d e r t h e provisions f r o m t h e c h a n g e o f g r a d e K T h e f a C t ^ a t f t h e 
of this section and § 3590, is n o t a su i t to con- improvements, were m a d e before t he adoption 
demn land belonging t o t h e c i ty , a n d i t is not o f °?\&*' \Bf*' * ? ' d ° e 0 s T D T o t r ^ e ™ n P ^ 
necessary to show, I s p r o v i d e d in § 3591, t h a t g i m b a " V , S - LQ ^ , 3 2 U - — ; 90 P - 3 9 5 
the use to which i t is t o be app l ied b y power g e m pstead v _S L Chtv, 32 U. — - ; 90 P . 397. 
oompany is a more necessa ry pub l i c use t h a n F e l t v - S - L ' ^ 3 2 U - >' 9 0 R 4 0 2 -
•^3589. Estates and rights subject to condemnation. The following is a 
classification of the estates and rights in lands subject to be taken for public 
u s e : . • • • • 
1. A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds, or for per-
manent buildings, for reservoirs and dams, and permanent flooding occasioned 
thereby, or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit.of debris or tail-
uigs.of a mine, millj smelter, or other place for the reduction of ores; 
2. An easement, when taken for any other use; 
3. The right of entry upon, and occupation of, lands, and tne rignt to 
take therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees, and timber as may be necessary 
|or some public use. 
;.Cal. c , Civ. P . , § 1239*. 
3590. Property subject to condemnation. The private property which /?*% ?* 
*ay be taken under this chapter includes: . /7 ¥ ^ * 6 
1. All real property belonging to any person ; 
2. Lands belonging to the state, or to any county, or incorporated city 
o r
 town, not appropriated to some public use; 
3. Property appropriated to public use; provided, that such proper ty / t v -v - * 
l^all not be taken unless for a .more necessary public use than that to which it 
|* s been already appropr ia ted; 
P. 4. Franchises for toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, and all other franchises; 
WovtdedJ that such franchises shall not be taken unless for free highways, rail-
roads, or other more necessary public use; 
5. All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned in § 3588, and / ^ ^ > ? 
^ y and all structures and improvements thereon, and the lands held or used /?y v> / 7 . 
p connection therewith, shall be subject to be connected with, crossed, or in-
l^sected by any other rlight of way or improvement or structure thereon; 
iJty s^all also be subject to a limited use in common with the owners thereof,-
IPten necessary; but such uses of crossings, intersections, and connections 
7 
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3387 Warranty Deed 
Bayard M. Crossgrove and wife Matilda Crossgrove Grantors, of Draper, in the county of 
alt Lake State of Utah, hereby convey and warrent to Utah Lake Irrigation Company, a corporation 
ratee, of Provo City, Utah County, Utah for the sum of of Three Hundred Fifty and no/100 
ollars, the following described tract of land in Salt Lake County, state of Utah, to-wit: 
eginning 3914.5 feet North and 2303.6 feet East from the Southwest corner of Section 33, 
ownship 3 South, Range 1 West, of the salt Lake Base and Merridian, said point being on the 
outh property line and on the center line of canal, thence a strip of land 3 rods wide ex-
ending 2 rods to the left and 1 rod to the right of the center line of canal, described as follows: 
n a 11 degree 26' curve to the right 89.2 feet; thence North 12 degrees 37' East 50 feet; 
hence on a 16°04' curve to the left 195.7 feet, thence North 18°49* West 111.0 feet to the North 
roperty line. Area 0.51 acres. 
The grantee agrees to construct and maintain one concrete bridge and two 1 foot galvanized 
ron flumes, across its canal for the use of the grantor. 
Said strip of land to be used for canal purposes only 
The Grantors reserve the right to fence across the canal at the boundaries of the grantors 
land, 
rovided, such fence shall be provided with suitable gates and shall not interfere with the oper-
-ion and maintenace of said canal 
Witness the hand of said Grantors this eighth day of April A.D. 1914 
Signed in the Presence of 
D.O. Rideout Bayard M. Crosgrove 
State of Utah ) Matilda Crosgrove 
ss . 
County of Salt Lake ) On the eighth day of March A.D. 1914, personally appeared before me 
jyard M.Crosgrove and his wife Matilda Crosgrove the signers of the above instrument, 
\o duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
My commission expires Feb. 23, 1915 D.O. Rideout 
(Seal) Notary Public 
^rded at the request of Utah Lake Irrigation Company, Apr. 10, 1914 at 9:59 A.M. in M9-CMof 
,~dspage 
.6. Abstracted in "D-5", Page 101 Lines 50, "D-12" Page 206 Line 28. Recording fee 
Lid 90C.(Signed) Clarence M. Cannon, Recorder, Salt Lake County, Utah, By 
G. Collett, Deputy 
•anscribed By: John B. Stahl, PLS 
,te: July 12, 2005 
• rne r s tone P r o f e s s i o n a l Land Surveys , I n c . 
O. Box 901617 
I t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84090 
01) 495-2360 
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23386 Warranty Deed 
Charles M. Crosgrove and his wife Elizabeth Crosgrove, grantors, of Draper, in the County 
of Salt Lake State of Utah, hereby convey and warrant to Utah Lake Irrigation Company, a 
corporation grantee, of Provo City, Utah County, Utah, for the sum of Five Hundred Seventy-
Five and no/100 Dollars, the following described tract of land in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
to-wit : Beginning 3496.9 feet North and 2365.1 feet East from the Southwest corner of 
Section 33, Township 3 South, Range 1 East, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Said point being 
on the south property line and on the center line of canal; thence a strip of land 3 rods 
tfide extending 2 rods to the left and one rod to the right of the center line of canal described 
as follows: North 9 degrees 57' West 314.2 feet; thence on a line 11 degrees 26' curve to the 
right 108.2 feet to the North property line, area 0.48 acres. 
pg-116 pg.116 
U s o beginning 4348.7 feet North and 2280.0 feet East from the Southwest corner of Section 33, 
Township 3 South, Range 1 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian; said point being on the 
South property line and on the center line of canal; thence a strip of land 3 rods wide 
sxtending 2 rods to the left and 1 rod to the right of the center line of canal described as 
follows: North 18 degrees 49' West 349.6 feet to the north property line. Area 0.40 acres. 
The Grantee agrees to construct and maintain 2 concrete bridges and two, 1 foot galvanized 
iron flumes across its canal for the use of the grantors. 
Said strip of land to be used for canal purposes only. 
Witness the hand of said Grantors this eighth day of April A.D. 1914 
Signed in the Presence of D.O. Rideout Charles M. Crosgrove 
State of Utah ) Elizabeth Crosgrove 
ss . 
County of Salt Lake ) 
On the eighth day of March A.D. 1914, personally appeared before me Charles M. 
crosgrove and his wife Elizabeth Crosgrove the signers of the above instrument, who 
iuly acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
My commission expires Feb. 23, 1915 D.O. Rideout 
(Seal) Notary Public 
Recorded at the request of Utah Lake Irrigation Company, Apr. 10, 1914 at 9:58 A.M. in "9-C" 
3f deeds pages 115-116. Abstracted in "D-12", Page 206, Lines 25 to 27. Recording fee paid 90C. 
(Signed) Clarence M. Cannon, Recorder, Salt Lake County, Utah, By R.G. Collett, Deputy 
= = =========================================end of document = = ======= === === ============ === = = = = = = = = = = 
Transcribed By: John B. Stahl, PLS 
)ate: June 24, 2005 
Cornerstone P r o f e s s i o n a l Land S u r v e y s , I n c . 
> . 0 . Box 901617 
5 a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84090 
[801) 4 9 5 - 2 3 6 0 
[801) 495 -2361 f a x 
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IK THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,STATE OF UTAH. 
UTAH LAM IRRIGATION COMTANY, 
a corporation, 
Piaiuliff 
ye JUDOEMENT IN CONDEMNATION 
BUBANBAH CRANE,WILL1AM E. CRANE,JOHN A.CRANE, 
ALFRED CRANE,ELMER L.CRANE,8ARAH F.CRANE, 
BERTHA L.CRANE,ALMA E.CRANE, LUCIUS E.CRANE and 
DAOTORD B.CRANE, 
Defendants, 
Thie aotion waB commenced t o condemn the property here inaf ter 
deBoribed fox the purpose of conetruct ing and maintaining a canal thereon , 
and the oourt being of the opinion t h a t the use to which the eaid land 
i e t o be applied ie a public one authorised by law, and the Baid p a r t i e t 
having reached an agreement, and having f i l e d herein a s t i p u l a t i o n p r o -
v id ing among other things that a decree of condemnation be entered h e r e i n : 
NOW THEREFORE, on motion of B.D.Huffaker,one of oounBel for defend 
antB, and in accordance with the s a i d e t i p u l a t i o n , i t i e hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED,and DECREED THAT PLAINTIFF t a k e and acquire and have for i t e use 
in f e e the sa id land hereinafter d e s c r i b e d , and that p l a i n t i f f pay 
defnedaats as compensation therefor th© sum of Seven Hundred D o l l a r s . 
It i s further ORDERED,ADJUDGED,and DECREED that p l a i n t i f f Bhall 
l eave the ground on e i ther Bide of the sa id canal where i t runs through 
the orchard of defendants without p l a c i n g any d ir t thereon from the 
excavation of the saic canal, and that p l a i n t i f f s h a l l construct and 
maintain a fec6d bridge over the s a i d canal at a place des ignated by de -
fendants , and that defendants e h a l l have the r ight t o p lace wire gates 
across the sa id canal in three p l a c e s , and that they e h a l l have tbe r igh t 
t o water etock from the said canal*, and p l a i n t i f f s h a l l construct two flume 
where needed. 
The property refered t o here in i s l o c a t e d i n Sa l t Lake County^Utab 
and par t i cu lar ly described as f o l l o w s : 
Beginning 4679.7 feet North and 2167 .2 f e e t East from the South-
west corner of 8ect ion 35,Township 3 8outh of Range 1 East of 
Salt Lake Base Meridian, Baid p o i n t being on the center l i n e of 
canal and on the South property l i n e ; t h e n o e a s t r i p of land 5 
rods wide extending 2 rods t o t h e l e f t and 1 rod t o the r ight 
of the oenter l i n e of canal d e s c r i b e d as f o l l o w s : North 18 degrees 
49• West 439.4 fee t t o an East and West fenoe l i n e ; thenoe 
a ttrlp of land 40 feet wide extending IB feet to the right and 
2b faet to the left of the canter line of canal detoribed ae followa* 
Borth 18 degreae 49» l e e t 150 feet 
Horth 41 degrees 16» Weft 9.7 feet to^ 
the Borth property line,containing 66/100 acree. . 
Dated at Bait Lake City, Utah, thie fat day o^^t^lL 
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15408 In the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
State of Utah, Sitting In And For Salt Lake County 
Utah Lake Irrigation Co., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff : Decree. 
vs 
Elida H. Smith, 
Defendant 
This case came on regularly for trial before the court and 
jury on the 16th day of September, 1914 and was concluded on 25th day 
of said month; S.R. Thurmon and A.J. Evans appearing as attorneys 
g.55 Pg.55 
for the plaintiff and H.A. Smith for the defendant, and the issues therein 
arising upon the complaint of plaintiff and the answer of the defendant 
Elida H. Smith having been tried before the court and a jury, and the 
jury having returned their verdict therein, which verdi_t is in words and 
figures, as follows, to-wit: 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
State of Utah Sitting In & For Utah County. 
Utah Lake Irrigation Co., : 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
Elida H. Smith, 
Defendant, 
Verdict of Jury. 
We the jurors impaneled in the above case, find the 
issues in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff for the 
value of the property sought to be condemned at ($216.00) as damages 
which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned and to 
the improvements thereon ($1261.33); total ($1477.33) 
Dated September 25, 1914 
Francis G. Luke, 
Foreman, 
And the court having found and determined that the use to which 
the parcel of land described in plaintiff's complaint and hereinafter 
described is to be applied to a public use, authorized by law and 
that the taking of said land is necessary to said use. 
Now therefore, on motion of A.J. Evans, one of the attorneys for 
plaintiff, it is 
Ordered, Adjudged & Decreed 
that the plaintiff take and acquire and have for its use for a right of 
way for its canal and for the construction, operation and perpetual 
maintenance of said canal and all matters pertaining there to for 
its successful operation into and over the following tract of land, 
to wit: 
Beginning at a point on the south property line 132.4 feet south 
and 1958.8 feet East from the southwest corner of section 28, township 
3 south range 1 east of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian said point 
being on the center line of canal; thence a strip of land 3 rods 
wide extending 1 rod to the right and 2 rods to the left of the center 
line of canal, described as follows: North 41°16" West 435 feet; 
thence a strip of land 2-1/2 rods wide, extending 1/2 rod to the right 
1 
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and 2 rods to the left of tne center line of canal described as follows: 
On a 15° curve to the right 49 feet, more or less, to the center line of 
a north and south street, area 0 54 acres. 
All in Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that plaintiff 
pay into court as compensation therefor and for the benefit of the 
defendant, the sum of $1477.33, the amount fixed by said verdict 
and the further sum of $75.20, the amount of defendants cost in 
this action, and that plaintiff pay its own costs, together with 
the costs of the commencement of this action. 
By the Court, 
Geo. G. Armstrong, 
Dated at Salt Lake City this 21st day of July 1915. 
>g . 56 pg.56 
Attest : -
Endo rsed Thos. Homer, Clerk, (Seal) 
Case #17713 By C.G. Patterson, Deputy Clerk 
Filed in the Clerk's Office, Salt Lake County, Utah 
July 21, 1915 Thos. Homer, Clerk 3rd Dist. Court 
By C.G. Patterson, Deputy Clerk. 
State of Utah ) 
ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Thos. Homer, Clerk of the Third Judicial 
District Court of the State of Utah, in and for Salt Lake County, 
do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and 
correct copy of the original decree. 
In the Case of the Utah Lake Irrigation Co., a corporation, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
Elida H. Smith, Defendant 
Case #17713 
as appears of record and file in my office. 
Witness my hand and the Seal of 
said Court, at Salt Lake City this 21st day of July A.D. 1915 
Thos. Homer, Clerk 
(Seal) By C G Patterson Deputy Clerk. 
Recorded at the request of A.J. Evans, July 21, 1915 at 2:55 P.M. in 
took "9-Z" of Deeds, pages 54-6. Abstracted in Bk. "D-12" page 189 lines 43-4: pg. 206 line 43 
Recording fee paid $1.90 
(Signed) Geo. H. Islaub Recorder Salt Lake County, Utah, By Wm. Swan, Deputy. 
===========================================end of document==================================== 
Transcribed By: John B. Stahl, PLS 
3ate: June 24, 2005 
Cornerstone Professional Land Surveys, Inc. 
P.O. Box 901617 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84090 
(801) 495-2360 
(801) 495-2361 fax 
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THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of the <#£) day of February 
2001. by and between DRAPER CITY, a Utah municipal corporation, hereinafter referred to as the 
"City," and DRAPER IRRIGATION COMPANY, a Utah corporation, hereinafter referred to as 
the "Company/1 
RECITALS: 
A. The Company is the owner of property commonly known as the Draper Irrigation 
Canal, located within Draper City, Utah, which real property is more particularly described in 
Exhibit UA" attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof (the "Canal Property"). 
B. The City is the owner of a parcel of land of approximately 10 acres, located at 
approximately 300 East and 11800 South within Draper City, State of Utah, and more particularly 
described in Exhibit "B" attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof (the "10-Acre 
Parcel"). 
C. City desires to acquire the Canal Property from the Company for use as a public trail 
and for storm drainage purposes. 
D. The parties desire to exchange the properties described in Exhibits UA" and "B" 
(hereinafter the "Properties"), for their mutual benefit. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein, and other 
good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the 
parties hereby agree as follows: 
1. Exchange. The parties hereby agree that the Company shall convey to the City the 
Canal Property and the City shall convey to the Company the 10-Acre Parcel. Conveyance of the 
Properties shall be accomplished by mutual quit claim deeds. 
2. Reservation of PIC Easement. Concurrent with the conveyance of the Properties 
as set forth in paragraph 1, above, the City hereby agrees to grant to the Company an easement for 
the construction and maintenance of culinary and secondary water lines and facilities within the 
Canal Property. The Quit Claim Deed from the Company to the City with the easement reserved 
shall be in substantially the same form as the attached Exhibit "C," incorporated herein by reference. 
The parties hereby agree that if the City grants easement or permits to use the Canal Property, said 
grantees shall not interfere with the Facilities of the Company, nor shall the Company be required 
to alter or relocate its Facilities at its expense to accommodate such grants. The location of said 
facilities, if within the aforesaid easement, shall be approved by the Company, said approval not to 
be unreasonably withheld. However, nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the City from 
granting easements, permits, or other rights for use of the Canal Property, not including the property 
encumbered by the easement reserved herein, at its sole discretion, provided that any such easement 
shall not interfere with the Company's construction and maintenance activities, nor shall such 
easement cause harm or damage to the Company's facilities. 
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3. Right to Discharge Water. The Company shall have the right, with the prior 
approval of the City, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld, to discharge water through 
the Canal Property. Such discharge may be subject to any reasonable conditions of approval as 
deemed necessary by the City. 
4. Construction of 300 East Street. The Company hereby agrees to construct 300 East 
Street commencing at approximately 12150 South and continuing along the entire frontage of the 10-
Acre Parcel. Said construction shall include three lanes of asphalt at an approximate total width of 
thirty-seven (37) feet, curb, gutter and sidewalk on the east side of 300 East Street adjacent to the 
Postal Service Property, storm drainage facilities, a ten-inch water line, and water laterals. The City 
hereby agrees to reimburse the Company for the cost associated with construction of one lane of 300 
East Street. The Company shall construct said street at the time the 10-Acre Parcel develops or 
within twenty-four (24) months from the date of this Agreement, whichever occurs first. The City 
shall reimburse the Company as provided herein within thirty (30) days of completion of 
construction of 300 East Street and receipt of invoices detailing the cost to be reimbursed. 
5. Mutual Cooperation. The Company and the City hereby pledge their mutual 
cooperation in providing information relating to the Properties to be exchanged as reasonably 
requested by the other party. 
6. Condition of Property. The parties accept the Properties "as is" in the current 
condition as of the date of this Agreement. 
7. Notices. Any notice required or desired to be given pursuant to this Agreement shall 
be delivered personally or mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, to the 
parties as follows: 
Company: Draper Irrigation Company 
Attn: 
12421 South 800 East 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Citv: Draper City 
Attn: City Manager 
12441 South 900 East 
Draper, UT 84020 
The City and the Company may change their addresses by notice given as required above. 
8. Default. Except as otherwise provided herein, in the event any party fails to perform 
its obligations hereunder or to comply with the terms hereof, within thirty (30) days after giving 
written notice of default, the non-defaulting party may, at its election, have all rights and remedies 
available at law and in equity, including injunctive relief, specific performance and/or damages. 
9. Survival. All the terms and conditions hereof and all instruments referred to herein 
and contemplated hereby shall survive closing and the transfer of title to City and shall remain in 
full force and effect in accordance with their terms. 
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10. Successors and Assigns. This Agreement shall bind each of the parties hereto and 
their respective heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns. 
11. Entire Agreement. This Agreement, with any exhibits incorporated by reference, 
constitutes the final expression of the parties agreement and is a complete and exclusive statement 
of the terms of that agreement. This Agreement supersedes all prior or contemporaneous 
negotiations, discussions and understandings, whether oral or written or otherwise, all of which are 
of no further effect. This Agreement may not be changed, modified or supplemented except in 
writing signed by the parties hereto. 
12. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance 
with the laws of the State of Utah. 
13. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of 
which shall constitute an original, but all of which taken together shall constitute one single 
agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement by and through 
their respective, duly authorized representatives as of the day and year first above written. 
"COMPANY" 
DRAPER IRRIGATION COMPANY 
By: c ~ / % £ ^ ^ 
Its: fi>£€S<OC/OT 
02\Agmt\DIC (Property Exchange>6 
Jan. 30,2001 
CITY ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the (Qft day of / ^n^ i i f l r t / 2001, personally appeared before me Richard D. Alsop, 
who being duly sworn, did saythatheis the Mayor of DRAPER CITY, a municipal corporation 
of the State of Utah, and that the foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of the City by authority 
of its governing body and said Richard D. Alsop acknowledged to me that the City executed the 
same. NOTARY PUBLIC 
KELLY D. ALDRIDGE 
12441 SOUTH 900 EAST 
DRAPER, UT 8402O 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
NOVEMBER 13TH.2004 
STATE OF UTAH 
My Commission Expires: 
lilhyh, (lUJqe. 








COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the /£ " day of MniOMf 2001, personally appeared before me /WtoOA^ 
p« Hff)'Y&iAs who being by me duly sworn did say that (s)he is the fUMidi/Jy 
of DRAPER IRRIGATION COMPANY, and that the foregoing instrument 
was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its Board of Directors; and 
they acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same. 
My Co. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Ramona M. Tuimauga 
12421 S. 800 E.»PO Box 275 
Draper, Utah 84020 





/Ipnl M hrujwi ht 
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